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ACCOUNTING FOR ADOLESCENTS’ TWICE 
DIMINISHED CULPABILITY IN 
CALIFORNIA’S FELONY MURDER RULE 
Raychel Teasdale* 
          In 2018, the California legislature passed S.B. 1437 to narrow 
California’s felony murder rule and theoretically apply the rule only to 
those with the greatest culpability in a murder. However, whether 
intentionally or negligently, the law leaves room to disproportionally and 
unjustly affect adolescents by charging those with “reckless 
indifference” with first-degree murder. Imbedded in psychology and 
neuroscience research is the conclusion that adolescent brain structure 
and function are still rapidly developing. As a result, adolescents are less 
able to weigh the risks of their actions, resist peer pressure, regulate their 
emotions, and control their impulses. Therefore, this Note argues that the 
“reckless indifference” standard under California Penal Code section 
189 should not apply to adolescents because they are inherently reckless. 
Instead, to charge an adolescent with first-degree murder, prosecutors 
should be required to prove the mens rea typically associated with first-
degree murder. Further, before charging an adolescent with second-
degree murder under a felony murder theory, a judge should be required 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The California Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the 
felony murder rule is a “‘highly artificial concept’ which deserves no 
extension beyond its required application.”1 Further, it recognized that 
the rule “anachronistically resurrects from a bygone age a ‘barbaric’ 
concept that has been discarded in the place of its origin” and “erodes 
the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability.”2 
Nevertheless, the felony murder rule still exists as a statute in 
California and contributes to overly harsh and unfair sentences for 
youthful offenders who are categorically less culpable than adults due 
to their cognitive and psychological development.3 
In 2007, over 2,500 individuals in the United States were serving 
life without parole for crimes they committed as minors, and as 
measured in 2005, 26 percent of minors serving life without parole 
were convicted of felony murder.4 In California, there are around 
5,206 individuals serving life without parole for felony murder, and 
 
 1. People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 709 (Cal. 1983) (quoting People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 
360 (Cal. 1966)); accord People v. Henderson, 560 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Cal. 1977); People v. Satchell, 
489 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Cal. 1971). 
 2. Dillon, 668 P.2d at 709 (quoting Phillips, 414 P.2d at 360 n.6); Dillon, 668 P.2d at 709 
(quoting People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965)). 
 3. This Note addresses individuals who are both below and above the age of eighteen, 
regardless of whether they are processed in either the juvenile or adult criminal justice system. 
Throughout the Note, the term minor is used to describe individuals under eighteen. Youthful 
offender is used to describe individuals under age twenty-five, and adolescent describes individuals 
between twelve and twenty-five years old, a period of time that psychologists have defined as a 
period of heightened development. See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental 
Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 9, 27 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (“[M]ost identity development 
takes place during the late teens and early twenties.”); Alan S. Waterman, Identity Development 
from Adolescence to Adulthood: An Extension of Theory and a Review of Research, 18 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 341, 355 (1982) (“The most extensive advances in identity formation 
occur during the time spent in college.”). In this Note, the term juvenile is used to describe someone 
under the jurisdiction of juvenile court, which is consistent with California Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 602. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 2019) (“[A]ny minor who is between 12 
years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when he or she violates any law of this state or of the 
United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an 
ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court.”). 
 4. ELIZABETH CALVIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AGAINST ALL ODDS: PRISON 
CONDITIONS FOR YOUTH OFFENDERS SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2012); AMNESTY INT’L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf. 
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nearly 62 percent were twenty-five years or younger at the time of the 
offense.5 
In light of staggering statistics like these, courts, legislatures, and 
voters have started to understand that youthful offenders are 
incarcerated at an alarming rate, and juvenile justice reform has been 
gaining traction. Within the past fifteen years, the United States 
Supreme Court decided that: (1) minors cannot be sentenced to the 
death penalty;6 (2) minor non-homicide offenders cannot be sentenced 
to life in prison without parole;7 (3) a suspect’s age is relevant in 
determining whether a reasonable person would consider themself in 
custody for Miranda purposes;8 (4) a sentencing scheme that mandates 
life in prison without parole for minor homicide offenders is 
prohibited and the court must first consider the offender’s age and 
circumstances;9 and (5) the new required sentencing considerations 
apply retroactively to final dispositions.10 
In addition, California made its own recent advancements in 
juvenile justice reform, recognizing that youthful offenders are 
different than adult offenders. California decided that: (1) a hearing 
considering mitigating factors tied to youth is required before a 
prosecutor can file a petition to transfer a juvenile to adult court;11 (2) 
youthful offenders under sixteen cannot be transferred to adult 
criminal court;12 (3) individuals convicted of an offense committed 
before the individual was eighteen years old, and sentenced to life 
without the possibility of parole, are eligible for parole after their 
 
 5. Statistics, FELONY MURDER ELIMINATION PROJECT, https://www.endfmrnow.org/new-
statistics (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
 6. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
 7. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). 
 8. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011). 
 9. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012). 
 10. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016) (applying the holding of Miller, 567 
U.S. at 732, retroactively). 
 11.  CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2016, GENERAL 
ELECTION 54–59 (2016), 
https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2342&context=ca_ballot_props. 
 12. S.B. 1391, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). While prosecutors have alleged that 
S.B. 1391’s retroactivity is unconstitutional, the resistance to S.B. 1391 is not relevant to this Note 
and does not alter the legality of the law. See Janet Cooper Alexander et al., Constitutionality of 
Senate Bill 1391, CAL. LEGAL SCHOLARS (Feb. 2019), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/1391-Constitutionality-Sign-on-Letter-FINAL.pdf; Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Prosecutors’ Attack on Youth Justice Reform Undermines Democracy, SACRAMENTO BEE 
(Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article225921805.html. 
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twenty-fifth year of incarceration;13 and (5) juvenile court generally 
does not have jurisdiction over offenders under age twelve.14 
Ultimately, research in neuroscience and developmental 
psychology has forced courts and legislatures to pay attention to the 
problem with sentencing youthful offenders to disproportionately long 
sentences.15 Because adolescents’ brain structure and function have 
not finished developing, and they are undergoing rapid neural 
plasticity, it is difficult for adolescents to weigh the risks of their 
actions, resist peer pressure, regulate their emotions, and control their 
impulses.16 As a result, youthful offenders are less culpable than adult 
offenders and, ultimately, should not be charged or sentenced in the 
same way as adult offenders.17 
Due to adolescents’ rapidly changing cognitive and behavioral 
development, the punishment justifications for felony murder, 
retribution and deterrence, lose credence when applied to youthful 
offenders.18 Retribution is inappropriate because youthful offenders 
are less blameworthy, and deterrence is inapplicable because 
 
 13. S.B. 394, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 14. S.B. 439, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). This bill excludes rape and murder 
cases. 
 15. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 n.5 (2012) (adopting this rationale as one of the 
bases for the Court’s decision, which was previously articulated in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
68 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005)). 
 16. Brief for the American Medical Association & the American Academy of Child & 
Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 4–14, Miller v. Alabama, 
567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646 and 10-9647), 2012 WL 121237, at *4–14 [hereinafter AMA 
Brief]; Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, 
National Association of Social Workers, & Mental Health America as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 6–19, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412 and 08-7621), 2009 WL 
2236778, at *6–19 [hereinafter APA Brief]; Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: 
Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of Childhood and Adolescence, 15 U. 
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 298–99 (2012). 
 17. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010). 
 18. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (“Because ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an 
offender’s blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an 
adult.’”); Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571) (stating that deterrence does 
not justify a life without parole sentence because “the same characteristics that render juveniles less 
culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence”); Roper, 543 
U.S. at 571 (“Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the 
penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”); 
Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 21–
23, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); see Brief of the A.B.A. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners at 17–20, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646 and 10-
9647), 2012 WL 166269, at *17–20 [hereinafter ABA Brief, Miller v. Alabama]; Brief for the 
A.B.A. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10–15, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) 
(Nos. 08-7412 and 08-7621). 
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adolescents are less capable of considering the punishments and 
consequences associated with their actions.19 
Further, the juvenile justice system was created in recognition of 
the differences between youthful and adult offenders.20 Among 
accountability and public safety, the primary goal of the juvenile 
justice system is rehabilitation.21 Rehabilitation is especially 
important for adolescents because their identities are not yet fully 
formed, and they are more amenable to change and rehabilitation.22 
Locking up a youthful offender for an extended period of time gives 
the offender little incentive to become a responsible member of 
society, and harsh sentencing practices are inconsistent with youths’ 
capacity for change.23 
Informed by these conclusions, the courts and legislature have 
afforded youthful offenders more protections in the criminal justice 
system.24 However, an area in juvenile justice law that the courts have 
yet to address is the felony murder rule. Before January 2019, when 
S.B. 1437 took effect, if a killing occurred during the commission of 
a felony, each felonious participant could be charged with felony 
murder, regardless of the individual’s role in the homicide.25 
Grounded in the transferred intent theory, the felony murder rule 
satisfied the mens rea malice required for murder by transferring an 
 
 19. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472; Graham, 560 U.S. at 72. 
 20. Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive 
Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2009) (“Juvenile courts were 
established and continue to operate on the principle that rehabilitation is a better response to 
delinquency than the punishment and stigma that generally accompany an adult conviction.”). 
 21. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 2016) (codifying that the purpose of the juvenile 
courts is to “provide protection and safety to the public” while providing juveniles with “protective 
services . . . care, treatment, and guidance consistent with their best interest” and to encourage the 
“rehabilitative objectives” of the code); Henning, supra note 20, at 1112. 
 22. Samantha Buckingham, Reducing Incarceration for Youthful Offenders with a 
Developmental Approach to Sentencing, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 847 (2013); Laurence Steinberg 
& Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by the Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, 
Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1016 (2003). 
 23. People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 454 (Cal. 2018); Miller, 567 U.S. at 472–73 (“Deciding 
that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society’ would require ‘mak[ing] a judgment 
that [he] is incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’”). Miller also stated that 
not even rehabilitation could justify a life without parole sentence for a minor because life without 
parole reflects “an irrevocable judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society, ‘at odds 
with a child’s capacity for change.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74). 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in 
the Wake of Roper, 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 302–03 (2012); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 
(West 2010), amended by CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2019). 
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individual’s intent to commit a felony to their intent to commit the 
murder that occurred during the commission of the felony.26 
Under S.B. 1437, only those who willingly participated in the 
homicidal act or an act that was likely to result in homicide can be 
charged with felony murder.27 While the bill positively limits the 
previous application of the felony murder rule, the revision still allows 
individuals to be convicted of first-degree murder without evidence of 
a “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing,” the higher mental 
culpability required under traditional first-degree murder.28 
Specifically, the revision allows prosecutors to charge individuals 
with first-degree felony murder simply by proving that the individual 
was a “major participant” in the underlying enumerated felony and 
acted with “reckless indifference to human life.”29 
This Note suggests that California should limit the felony murder 
rule’s application against individuals under twenty-five years old so 
that the “reckless indifference” standard outlined in the felony murder 
statute does not apply to those under twenty-five years old.30 Further, 
 
 26. See Keller, supra note 25, at 302–03 (“The crime of felony murder does not require an 
intent to kill . . .”). 
 27. In February 2018, Democratic Senator Nancy Skinner introduced S.B. 1437, which sought 
to narrow the felony murder rule and amend the California Penal Code. S.B. 1437, 2017–2018 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). The bill was passed in the Senate on August 30, 2018, with a 27 to 10 
majority and three votes unrecorded. SB-1437 Accomplice Liability for Felony Murder, CAL. 
LEGISLATIVE INFO., https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id= 
201720180SB1437 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). Governor Jerry Brown ultimately signed the bill 
on September 30, 2018, making the new rule effective in January 2019. Jazmine Ulloa, California 
Sets New Limits on Who Can Be Charged with Felony Murder, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2018), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-felony-murder-signed-jerry-brown-20180930-
story.html. 
 28. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2019) (codifying that outside of the felony murder 
context, first-degree murder requires a “kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing”); 
People v. Chiu, 325 P.3d 972, 979 (Cal. 2018) (“First degree murder, like second degree murder, 
is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but has the additional elements 
of willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, which trigger a heightened penalty.”); see also 
Chiu, 325 P.3d at 985 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (arguing that an accomplice cannot be convicted of 
first-degree murder on an aider and abettor theory that the actual killer committed a crime that was 
the natural and probable consequence of a murder unless the killer’s premeditation was reasonably 
foreseeable). 
 29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2019) (the definition of reckless indifference is to come 
from the definition under CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(d)). 
 30. While limiting the felony rule to individuals under eighteen may give this Note’s 
proposition even greater force, the reckless indifference standard should not apply to any individual 
under age twenty-five because, as explained in Part III, the time between twelve and twenty-five 
years old is a period that psychologists have defined as a period of heightened development. 
Further, the cases that recognize juveniles’ twice-diminished capacity are based on adolescent 
developmental research. See Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 27 (“[M]ost identity 
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before charging an adolescent with second-degree murder under a 
felony murder theory, a judge should be required to analyze the 
defendant’s culpability using the same factors listed in the 
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. 
Before an adolescent can be convicted of first-degree murder, 
prosecutors should be required to prove the mens rea required outside 
the felony murder context, eliminating prosecutors’ ability to 
piggyback off the adolescent’s underlying felony charge.31 For 
example, if an adolescent allegedly committed a robbery that resulted 
in a death, the prosecutor should be required to prove that the killing 
was willful, deliberate, and premeditated before the adolescent can be 
convicted of first-degree felony murder. A “reckless indifference” 
standard should not be the threshold used to convict an adolescent of 
first-degree murder. The conclusion that adolescents lack the ability 
to measure and assess risk, foresee negative consequences, and act 
rationally is at the very core of adolescent development research.32 
Considering these conclusions, it is illogical to apply a “reckless 
indifference” standard when charging an adolescent with first-degree 
murder. 
Instead, if an adolescent (1) intended to kill but did not possess 
premeditation and deliberation; or (2) knew that the act was dangerous 
to human life and had a conscious disregard for human life, then the 
state could prosecute them for second-degree murder.33 The felony 
 
development takes place during the late teens and early twenties.”); Waterman, supra note 3, at 355 
(“The most extensive advances in identity formation occur during the time spent in college.”). 
 31. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (codifying that outside of the felony murder context, first-
degree murder requires a “kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing”); Chiu, 325 P.3d at 
979 (“First-degree murder, like second-degree murder, is the unlawful killing of a human being 
with malice aforethought, but has the additional elements of willfulness, premeditation, and 
deliberation which trigger a heightened penalty.”). 
 32. Brief of the American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, supra note 18, at 12; Isabelle M. Rosso et al., Cognitive and Emotional Components 
of Frontal Lobe Functioning in Childhood and Adolescence, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 355, 
360–61 (2004); see Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of 
Atkins for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 515 (2003). 
 33. CALCRIM No. 520. If the jury finds the defendant guilty of murder, it is murder of the 
second-degree, unless first-degree murder is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Murder 
involves an act that caused death and a state of mind either of express or implied malice 
aforethought. Id. Express malice aforethought is found when the perpetrator unlawfully intended 
to kill. Id. Implied malice aforethought is when the perpetrator: (1) intentionally committed an act; 
(2) the natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; (3) at the time 
of the act, the perpetrator knew the act was dangerous to human life; and (4) the defendant 
deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life. Id.; see Chiu, 325 P.3d at 979 (“First 
degree murder, like second degree murder, is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
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murder statute is therefore unnecessary. In the alternative, if the 
adolescent committed a felony that is not inherently dangerous, and 
did not possess conscious disregard for human life, the state can 
pursue involuntary manslaughter charges.34 
In implementing such a change, California should extend the 
same rationale used in recent United States Supreme Court decisions 
and California law reforms: the neurological and psychological 
development that occurs during adolescence makes adolescents less 
capable of avoiding a mental state of reckless indifference and, 
ultimately, makes them less culpable than adults. 
Part II of this Note outlines the history of the felony murder rule 
and explains the rule’s rationales. The rule’s rationales focus on 
retribution and deterrence, which not only fail in the felony murder 
context but also provide zero justification in cases involving youthful 
offenders. Part III outlines what is known about adolescent 
psychological development and neuroscience and its correlation to the 
cognitive and psychological abilities essential to decision-making and 
rational thinking. Part IV provides an overview of the recent federal 
and California laws advancing juvenile justice reform. Part V explains 
why scientific research, the goals of the juvenile justice system, and 
recent advancements in juvenile justice reform support a felony 
murder rule that excludes adolescents. 
Finally, Part VI proposes a new felony murder rule. This new rule 
will exclude adolescents from the third mental culpability standard 
 
aforethought, but has the additional elements of willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, which 
trigger a heightened penalty.”); see also CALJIC No. 8.30 (“Murder of the second degree is [also] 
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when the perpetrator intended 
unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and 
premeditation.” (emphasis added)). 
 34. CALCRIM No. 581. A person commits involuntary manslaughter if the defendant’s 
criminal negligence caused the death of another. Id. A defendant acts with criminal negligence 
when they act in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury and a 
reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In contrast 
to murder, the defendant does not possess a conscious disregard to human life. Id. The definition 
for an “inherently dangerous” felony is vague. See Henry v. Spearman, 899 F.3d 703, 707–08 (9th 
Cir. 2018). California courts define inherently dangerous by looking to “the elements of the felony 
in the abstract, not the particular facts” of the defendant’s conduct. People v. Chun, 203 P.3d 425, 
434 (Cal. 2009). The California Supreme Court has asked whether, “by its very nature, [the crime] 
cannot be committed without creating” an undue risk to human life. People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 
894, 900 (Cal. 1984). At other times it has considered the ordinary commission of a crime, “even 
if, at the time of the [offense],” there was no innate risk at all. People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022, 
1027 (Cal. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Chun, 203 P.3d at 435. However, the California 
Supreme Court has stated that a felony that “can be committed without endangering human life” is 
not inherently dangerous. People v. Howard, 104 P.3d 107, 112 (Cal. 2005). 
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sufficient to find felony murder: “the person was a major participant 
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human 
life.”35 Further, before charging an adolescent with second-degree 
murder under a felony murder theory, a judge should be required to 
analyze the defendant’s culpability using the same factors listed in the 
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. These changes 
will force the state to find alternative means to charge an adolescent 
with murder. Youthful offenders are less culpable than adult 
offenders. Therefore, to charge an adolescent with first-degree 
murder, prosecutors should be required to prove an accurate mens rea 
of premeditation and deliberation rather than “reckless indifference,” 
and at least an intent to kill, when an adolescent participates in a felony 
that results in a death. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE FELONY MURDER RULE 
A.  The Felony Murder Rule and Its Origins 
Generally, to prove a crime, the prosecution must prove that there 
was an actus reas and mens rea.36 The actus reas is the physical, 
voluntary criminal act itself, and the mens rea is the culpable mental 
state required under the statute.37 Although most crimes have a mens 
rea requirement, some acts that are deemed so harmful to the public 
are considered crimes solely because of the actus reas.38 These are 
called strict liability crimes.39 
Traditionally, felony murder is a type of strict liability crime.40 If 
a person is killed during the course of a felony, to satisfy the requisite 
intent for murder, the felony murder rule transfers the felonious actor’s 
malicious intent to commit the felony to their intent to commit the 
murder.41 This ultimately charges individuals for unintentional 
killings based on their intent to commit a felony. 
 
 35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189. 
 36. LAURIE L. LEVENSON & ALEX RICCIARDULLI, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 2:2 (2018–
2019 ed.). 
 37. Id. In some cases, the actus reas can be an omission that amounts to a crime. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Alison Burton, Note, A Commonsense Conclusion: Creating a Juvenile Carve Out to the 
Massachusetts Felony Murder Rule, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 171 (2017) (“The felony 
murder rule is a form of strict liability.”). 
 41. Id. 
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While the concept of the felony murder rule is widely understood 
amongst lawyers, there are two working theories regarding the rule’s 
origins: the traditional and contemporary views.42 Traditional 
commentators believe that the rule was first established in English 
common law to attribute malice to a felon for their co-felon’s 
murderous act, thus, creating a strict liability crime.43 
Contemporary legal scholars suggest that felony murder 
developed based on a seventeenth century English judge’s definition 
of an “unlawful act killing” that was subsequently misinterpreted and 
incorrectly applied to multiple cases in the late nineteenth century.44 
The modern felony rule then made its way to the United States after 
William Blackstone incorporated the misinterpreted rule in his 
Commentaries on the Law of England, which became American 
lawyers’ reference for common law principals.45 
England’s doctrine was much more limited than the United 
States’ later-adopted, broad-sweeping felony murder doctrine.46 The 
English doctrine required an affirmative act of violence, inherently 
dangerous to human life, in the commission or attempt of a felony.47 
England’s felony murder rule added little to their existing laws 
attributing intent to kill unintended victims to those who had intent to 
commit the violent act, and the rule never held felons strictly liable for 
accidental deaths.48 As a result, contemporary theorists believe that the 
true first felony murder rules did not start in medieval England but in 
nineteenth-century America.49 Still, England recognized the felony 
murder rule’s injustice and limited usefulness, and abolished it in 
1957.50 
 
 42. Sterling Root, Senior Thesis, Juvenile Culpability and the Felony Murder Rule: Applying 
the Enmund Standard to Juveniles Facing Felony Murder Charges, TRINITY COLL. DIG. 
REPOSITORY 12 (2016), https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1579& 
context=theses. 
 43. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional 
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 449 (1985). 
 44. Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 83–
84, 102–03 (2004). 
 45. Id. at 95. 
 46. Id. at 64. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 107. 
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In the United States, the early felony murder rule required intent 
to inflict an injury during the felony.51 However, by the 1820s, states 
enacted broader felony murder statutes that imposed liability for any 
killing, even unintentional killings, that occurred during the 
commission of a felony.52 
B.  California’s Felony Murder Statute 
California’s first felony murder rule was adopted in 1850 and 
afforded murder liability for involuntary killings that occurred “in the 
perpetration of any felony, when the circumstances showed an 
‘abandoned and malignant heart.’”53 In 1856, California specifically 
created first-degree felony murder, which involved murders that 
occurred in the course of enumerated dangerous felonies.54 
In California’s first actual felony murder case in 1865, People v. 
Pool,55 two stagecoach robbers were convicted of murder after one 
intentionally killed an arresting officer.56 The other robber who did not 
shoot the officer was also charged with murder because the defendants 
conspired to rob and kill anyone, if necessary, so any death that 
resulted in furtherance of that plan made each liable for murder.57 
In the late nineteenth century, three California Supreme Court 
cases suggested an even broader rule, which set the tone for the 
modern California felony murder rule.58 To satisfy the mens rea 
element required for murder, the intent to commit the inherently 
dangerous felony was transferred to, or merged to become, the intent 
to commit the murder.59 The People v. Olsen60 court rejected the 
argument that felony murder only covered a co-felon’s killing if it was 
 
 51. Id. at 65–66. 
 52. Id. at 65. 
 53. Id. at 121. Abandoned and malignant heart murder requires “an act of violence, and 
reckless disregard of a danger of death.” Id. at 185. 
 54. See id. at 167. 
 55. 27 Cal. 572 (1865). 
 56. Binder, supra note 44, at 165. 
 57. Id. The conviction was predicated on the felons’ conspiracy, but later cases broadened the 
felony murder rule. Id. 
 58. See People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 (1874); see also People v. Olsen, 22 P. 125 (Cal. 1889) 
(utilizing the transferred intent theory); People v. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560, 563 (1875) (“If the 
homicide in question was committed by one of his associates engaged in the robbery, in furtherance 
of their common purpose to rob, he is as accountable as though his own hand had intentionally 
given the fatal blow . . . .”). 
 59. Binder, supra note 44, at 165–66. 
 60. 22 P. 125 (Cal. 1889).   
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the “ordinary and probable effect of the wrongful act especially agreed 
on,” and consequently charged unintentional killings as murder.61 
Olsen also confirmed that felonies not enumerated in the felony 
murder statute could support a second-degree felony murder charge, 
which exists in California’s Penal Code today.62 
Prior to the recent addition to the rule under S.B. 1437, 
California’s felony murder rule was only detailed in one section of the 
California Penal Code: 
(a)  All murder which . . . is committed in the perpetration of, 
or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, 
burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act 
punishable . . . or any murder which is perpetrated by means 
of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally 
at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to 
inflict death, is murder of the first-degree.63 
The felony murder rule did not require premeditation or malice 
aforethought normally required under a first-degree murder charge.64 
Instead, the perpetrator only needed the specific intent to commit one 
of the felonies enumerated in the statute.65 Once this intent to commit 
the felony was found, there was no requirement that the perpetrator 
have a specific mental culpability to commit the killing itself.66 
The new California felony murder rule under S.B. 1437 includes 
the same language stated above, under California Penal Code section 
189(a). However, an additional section was added that reads: 
(e)  A participant in the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a 
 
 61. Olsen, 22 P. at 126; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(a) (West 2019). 
 62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(b). “All other kinds of murders are of the second degree.” People 
v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 553 (Cal. 1989) (describing a homicide that is a direct result of an 
inherently dangerous felony that is not enumerated in California Penal Code section 189(a), as “at 
least second-degree murder”). 
 63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2014) (prior to S.B. 1437, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2018)). 
 64. People v. Chiu, 325 P.3d 972, 979 (Cal. 2018) (“First degree murder, like second degree 
murder, is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but has the additional 
elements of willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation which trigger a heightened penalty.”). In 
Chiu, the court declined to extend a first-degree murder charge for participating in a crime that 
naturally, probably, and foreseeably would result in a murder. Id. The court reasoned that first-
degree murder is understood to include a heightened culpability. Id. 
 65. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2019); People v. Chun, 203 P.3d 425, 430 (Cal. 2009). 
 66. Chun, 203 P.3d at 430; People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 136 (Cal. 1965) (stating that 
“even if the killing be accidental or unintentional, if committed in the attempt to perpetrate one of 
the felonies named in section 189 it is first degree murder”). 
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death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following 
is proven: 
(1)  The person was the actual killer. 
(2)  The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent 
to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the 
commission of murder in the first degree.67 
(3)  The person was a major participant in the underlying 
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as 
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.68 
Instead of allowing any accidental killing to be a murder if a death 
occurs during the commission of a felony, California Penal Code 
section 189(e) outlines more specific circumstances required for 
felony murder culpability. A defendant is only liable for felony murder 
if they were the actual killer, intended to kill and aided and abetted the 
actual killer, or, as this Note focuses on, was a major participant in the 
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.69 Still, the 
degree of the murder, either first or second, depends on the type of 
felony committed, and not the varying mental culpability of the 
perpetrator.70 Therefore, under section 189(e)(3), an individual can 
still be charged with first-degree murder, a conviction that comes with 
twenty-five years to life, without even a showing of intent to kill.71 
 
 67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e)(1), (2). Section 189(e)(1) describes an actual killer with an 
unknown intent. Does this merely describe the trigger person regardless of intent? Section 189(e)(2) 
describes an individual with intent to kill but without premeditation or deliberation. However, it 
fails to describe what type of first-degree murder the individual aided. While these sections are not 
the topic of this Note, these standards also leave room to disproportionately affect adolescents 
because they allow an individual to be convicted of first-degree murder based on a lower standard 
of mental culpability than typically required for first-degree murder. It still does not address that 
adolescents may not foresee that engaging in a felony can result in murder. 
 68. S.B. 1437, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e) (West 2019). 
 70. Id. § 189(a). “All other kinds of murders are in the second degree.” California Penal Code 
section 189(a) states the specific felonies that will make an individual liable for first-degree murder. 
People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 553 (Cal. 1989) (describing a homicide that is a direct result of 
an inherently dangerous felony that is not enumerated in California Penal Code section 189(a), as 
“at least second degree murder”). 
 71. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189. If an individual committed a felony enumerated in section 
189(a), was a major participant in the felony, and acted with a “reckless indifference” to human 
life, they can be charged with first-degree felony murder. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 2014) 
(“Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death, imprisonment in the 
state prison for life without the possibility of parole, or imprisonment in the state prison for a term 
of 25 years to life.”); see People v. Chiu, 325 P.3d 972, 979 (Cal. 2018) (“First degree murder, like 
second degree murder, is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but has 
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Further, California Penal Code section 188 previously stated: 
[Malice] may be express or implied. It is express “when there 
is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away 
the life of a fellow creature.” It is implied “when no 
considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances 
attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant 
heart.”72  
When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional 
doing of an act with express or implied malice as defined 
above, no other mental state need be shown to establish the 
mental state of malice aforethought.73 
S.B. 1437 clarifies section 188 by changing the fourth sentence to 
read: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to 
be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice 
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on 
his or her participation in a crime.”74 This prohibits an individual from 
being convicted of murder simply by implying malice from their 
participation in a felony, which had been an unfortunate consequence 
of the previous felony murder rule.75 However, the statute still allows 
an individual to be charged with murder without proving the specific 
elements required under malice aforethought.76 As long as one of the 
requirements described in subdivisions 189(e)(1)–(3) is proven, and 
the individual intentionally committed an inherently dangerous 
felony, an individual can be charged with murder.77 This ultimately 
sets a lower standard to prove murder, even in the second degree. 
The amendments to the law are retroactive, meaning that those 
who were previously convicted of felony murder can file a petition to 
have their felony murder sentences vacated and their charges 
 
the additional elements of willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation which trigger a heightened 
penalty.”). 
 72. People v. Chun, 203 P.3d 425, 429 (Cal. 2009) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 188). A 
person with an “abandoned and malignant heart” lacks a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill, 
but instead deliberately acts with a conscious disregard for human life by knowing that the conduct 
endangers life. People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 361 (Cal. 1996); Binder, supra note 44, at 185 
(describing abandoned and malignant heart as a reckless disregard of a danger of death). 
 73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 2014) (amended 2019) (emphasis added). 
 74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188(a)(3) (West 2019). 
 75. Binder, supra note 44, at 165–66. 
 76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188(a)(3) (“Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in 
order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought”); see 
CALCRIM No. 520 (explaining malice aforethought). 
 77. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e). 
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resentenced on any remaining counts.78 Moreover, those entitled to 
relief under the new law will be given credit for the time that they have 
already served.79 
The new law moves closer toward allocating proportional 
responsibility by narrowing the application of the felony murder rule 
to those who are most commonly believed to be responsible for a 
killing.80 Nevertheless, the rule does not go far enough to protect 
adolescents. The rule’s “reckless indifference” standard still leaves 
room for the state to charge adolescents with first-degree murder, the 
highest degree of murder, without evidence that the adolescent 
possessed the highest form of mental culpability. A “reckless 
indifference” standard does not involve a deliberate attempt to kill, 
premeditation, or deliberation.81 It describes conduct that a person 
should know endangers human life.82 However, as described in Part 
III, adolescents have a weakened ability to appreciate the risks and 
dangerous consequences of their actions.83 Therefore, as it stands 
today, California’s felony murder rule condones unjustly punishing 
adolescents for murder because of their developmental limitations.84 
 
 78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.95. 
 79. Id. For example, if an individual was convicted of felony murder for a robbery and their 
participation in the murder does not rise to the standard outlined in the revised section 189 statute, 
then the felony murder conviction will be vacated and the individual will be sentenced for the 
robbery. The individual will be given credit for time served and can therefore be released if they 
have already served the amount of time that was newly calculated. While the issue of retroactivity 
is not the focus of this Note, opponents of the new statute say that it will be difficult to determine 
which individuals were convicted under a theory of felony murder, leading to unmanageable 
volumes of petitions. Robert Brown et al., The Death of Felony Murder?: CDAA Webinar on SB 
1437, CAL. DIST. ATT’Y ASS’N (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.cdaa.org/wp-content/uploads/Death-
of-Felony-Murder.pdf. 
 80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e). The statute charges those who (1) were the actual killer; (2) 
intended to kill, or aided the actual killer; or (3) were a “major participant” who acted with reckless 
indifference to human life during the underlying felony offense. Id. 
 81. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157–58 (1987) (describing reckless indifference as 
“knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Levick et al., supra note 16, at 294. 
 84. As discussed in Part V, the rule’s effects result in sentencing minors to longer sentences 
because they can be charged with first-degree or second-degree murder, instead of being charged 
with the felony they committed. Further, the felony murder rule results in more transfers of minors 
from juvenile to adult court, where they will likely receive longer and harsher sentences. See Erin 
H. Flynn, Comment, Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: Juvenile Deterrence and Retribution 
Post-Roper v. Simmons, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1049, 1060 (2008). 
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C.  “Major Participant” and “Reckless Indifference” Defined 
The “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life” 
requirements under the new felony murder rule are the same standards 
used in California Penal Code section 190.2(d) to determine whether 
a defendant committed a special circumstances murder and is eligible 
for the death penalty.85 Therefore, California courts will look toward 
special circumstances murder cases to determine the standard under 
the new felony murder rule.86 
The Court in Tison v. Arizona87 stated that the “major participant” 
and “reckless indifference” “requirements significantly overlap” 
because “the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony 
murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to 
human life.”88 Therefore, it is imperative to discuss how California 
courts analyze both requirements. 
1.  Major Participant 
In People v. Proby,89 the court found that a “major participant” is 
“‘notable or conspicuous in effect or scope’ and is ‘one of the larger 
or more important members or units of a kind or group.’”90 In the more 
recent case, People v. Banks,91 the defendant was a getaway driver for 
an armed robbery in which one of the co-defendants shot and killed a 
security guard.92 The Banks court agreed with the Proby court’s 
definition of major participant but found that the jury must also weigh 
the following factors before making a “major participant” 
determination: 
 
 85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e)(3) (“The person was a major participant in the underlying 
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 
190.2.”); id. § 190.2(d) (“[E]very person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to 
human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, 
or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in section 190.2 (a)(17) which results in the 
death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first-degree therefore, 
shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of 
parole if a special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been found to 
be true under Section 190.4.”); S.B. 1437 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 86. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e)(3). 
 87. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 88. Id. at 153. 
 89. 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 1363 (3d ed. 1971)). 
 90. Id. at 711. 
 91. 351 P.3d 330 (Cal. 2015). 
 92. Id. at 333. 
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What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal 
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the 
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What 
awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed 
by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience 
or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant 
present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or 
prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or 
inaction play a particular role in the death? What did 
the defendant do after lethal force was used?93 
In assessing a defendant’s degree of participation, the Banks court 
suggested that juries consider the differing levels of culpability 
between the defendants in Tison v. Arizona and Enmund v. Florida,94 
and that no single factor is necessary or sufficient.95 
In Enmund v. Florida, two people attempted to rob Thomas 
Kersey.96 However, after Kersey’s wife brought out a gun during the 
attempted robbery, the two people killed Kersey and his wife.97 
Enmund was outside the Kersey’s home at the time of the incident, 
allegedly waiting to help his two co-defendants escape after the 
crime.98 The jury found Enmund guilty of two counts of first-degree 
murder and one count of robbery, and Enmund was sentenced to the 
death penalty.99 However, the Supreme Court overturned Enmund’s 
original death sentence, finding that it violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.100 Because Enmund “did not commit the 
homicide, was not present when the killing took place, and did not 
participate in a plot or scheme to murder,” his culpability did not rise 
to the level of culpability to warrant the death penalty.101 The Court 
held that a felony murder aider and abettor “who does not . . . kill, 
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force 
will be employed” cannot receive the death penalty.102 
 
 93. Id. at 338–39. 
 94. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 95. Banks, 351 P.3d at 337–39. 
 96. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 786. 
 99. Id. at 785. 
 100. Id. at 788. 
 101. Id. at 795, 798. 
 102. Id. at 797. 
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In Tison v. Arizona, Ricky, Raymond, and Donald Tison 
facilitated their father’s and his cellmate’s armed breakout, in which 
the two prisoners held guards and visitors of the prison at gunpoint.103 
After they left the prison, their car got a flat tire, and Raymond waved 
down a family of four to help them.104 When the family stopped, the 
others emerged and held the family at gunpoint.105 Raymond and 
Donald drove the family into the desert, with the others following 
behind.106 The Tison brothers’ father and his cellmate then murdered 
the family, while the brothers did nothing to stop it.107 The United 
States Supreme Court agreed that the surviving brothers, Ricky and 
Raymond, fell outside the “intent to kill” standard as defined in 
Enmund.108 However, the Court held that even if a defendant does not 
possess the intent to kill, if they instead are a major participant in the 
underlying felony and possessed reckless indifference to human life, 
they can still satisfy the culpability requirement for capital 
punishment.109 The Court remanded the case to determine whether the 
brothers fell into that category.110 
In Banks, the court ultimately overturned the defendant’s death 
penalty sentence.111 It found that the defendant’s role as the getaway 
driver put his participation on the Enmund end of the “Tison-Enmund 
spectrum.”112 Like Enmund, the defendant was not at the scene when 
the victim was killed, played a minor role in planning the robbery, did 
not instigate the killing, and could not have prevented the killing. 
Further, without more, participation in an armed robbery does not 
involve “engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of 
death.”113 Therefore, the defendant did not qualify as a major 
participant. 
 
 103. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139 (1987). 
 104. Id. at 139–40. 
 105. Id. at 140. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 141. 
 108. Id. at 144. 
 109. Id. at 158. 
 110. Id. 
 111. People v. Banks, 352 P.3d 330, 345 (Cal. 2015). 
 112. Id. at 340. 
 113. Id. 
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2.  Reckless Indifference 
The Tison Court described reckless indifference as “knowingly 
engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death” 
or “anticipat[ing] that lethal force would or might be used in 
accomplishing the underlying felony.”114 The California Supreme 
Court has stated that recklessness encompasses a subjective and 
objective element.115 “The subjective element is the defendant’s 
conscious disregard of risks known to him or her.”116 The objective 
element requires the jury to determine whether the actor’s disregard of 
the risk, considering their perceptions, “involved a gross deviation 
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor’s 
situation would observe.”117 
The Tison Court listed examples of reckless indifference, such as: 
[T]he person who tortures another not caring whether the 
victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the 
course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the 
desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing 
the victim as well as taking the victim’s property.118 
These examples involve a defendant who personally killed a victim, 
instead of a defendant who was not the actual killer, a gray area that is 
relevant in the context of felony murder.119 
The People v. Clark120 court later applied Tison’s definition to a 
case that fell within the gray area.121 To determine whether the 
defendant exhibited “reckless indifference to human life,” the Clark 
court considered the specific facts of the case “in light of some of the 
case-specific factors that this court and other state appellate courts” 
used.122 The factors included:  
 
 114. Tison, 481 U.S. at 150–51, 157. 
 115. People v. Clark, 372 P.3d 811, 886–87 (Cal. 2018). 
 116. Id. at 883. 
 117. Id. As described below, the United States Supreme Court held that an individual’s age 
informs the Miranda analysis when deciding whether a reasonable person would believe that they 
were free to terminate a police interrogation. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–72 
(2011). Similarly, in determining whether conduct amounts to reckless indifference, involving “a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would 
observe,” the individual’s age should be considered. Id. 
 118. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157. 
 119. Clark, 372 P.3d at 883. 
 120. 372 P.3d 811 (Cal. 2018). 
 121. Id. at 884. 
 122. Id. 
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(1) knowledge of weapons and use and number of weapons, 
(2) physical presence at the crime and opportunities to 
restrain the crime and/or aid the victim, (3) duration of the 
felony, (4) defendant’s knowledge of cohort’s likelihood of 
killing, and (5) defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of 
the violence during the felony.123  
Again, no single factor is necessary or sufficient.124 
In Clark, defendant Clark was charged with two first-degree 
murders arising from a burglary and attempted robbery of a computer 
store.125 To charge Clark with two murders, prosecutors alleged that 
Clark surveilled the computer store in preparation of the robbery, was 
the head orchestrator of the plan, was seen departing from the store 
after a woman was murdered, and conspired to have his co-defendant 
murdered for testifying against Clark to a grand jury.126 
In finding that Clark did not possess reckless indifference to 
human life, the court found that though Clark planned the robbery, had 
knowledge that a gun would be used during the robbery, and may have 
hastily departed from the crime scene, there was a short period of 
interaction between the perpetrators and the victim, Clark likely did 
not know that his co-defendant would kill, and Clark planned the 
robbery with an attempt to minimize risk of violence.127 The court 
ultimately determined that “reckless indifference” likely encompasses 
a willingness to kill or assist in a killing, “even if the defendant does 
not specifically desire . . . death as the outcome of his actions.”128 
In an attempt to name situations that satisfy the “reckless 
indifference” standard, the California and United States Supreme 
Courts have found that the fact that a robbery involves a gun is 
insufficient to support a finding of reckless indifference to human life 
but that “the manufacture and planting of a live bomb” could possibly 
suffice.129 Though courts attempt to establish guidelines, acts that do 
 
 123. Id. at 884–87. 
 124. Id. at 884. 
 125. Id. at 828. 
 126. Id. at 829–34. 
 127. Id. at 884–88. 
 128. Id. at 883. 
 129. Id. at 882; People v. Banks, 351 P.3d 330, 344 n.9 (Cal. 2015). 
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or do not exhibit reckless indifference are difficult to distinguish and 
are case specific.130 
The “major participant” and “reckless indifference” analysis 
inherently include a foreseeability and awareness component.131 
However, science has shown, and the courts have found, that 
adolescents cannot effectively anticipate risks or foresee the 
consequences of their actions, making the bill’s standard illogical 
when applied to adolescents up to twenty-five years old.132 Further, as 
outlined below, the felony murder rule’s only justifications lack merit 
and further support the idea that this standard should not apply to 
adolescents. 
III.  ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 
Developmental psychology and neuroscience research continues 
to shed light on the developmental differences between adolescents 
and adults.133 Neuroscience established that certain brain regions that 
control adolescents’ thoughts, actions, and emotions continue to 
mature during a temporary stage of development that lasts until early 
adulthood.134 Due to their brain’s underdeveloped structure and 
function, adolescents lack the capacity for mature, independent 
judgments, predicting future consequences, and engaging in the cost-
benefit analysis needed to make rational decisions.135 Further, based 
on psychological assessment, adolescents are more vulnerable to peer 
pressure, trauma, and negative external influences, which influence 
 
 130. Banks, 351 P.3d at 338 (stating that the jury must consider the totality of the circumstances 
and the specific facts of the case). 
 131. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 144, 157 (1987) (describing reckless indifference as 
“engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death” or “anticipat[ing] that lethal 
force would or might be used”); Clark, 372 P.3d at 886 (using “defendant’s knowledge of cohort’s 
likelihood of killing” as a factor to determine reckless indifference); Banks, 351 P.3d at 338–39 
(“What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, 
weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants?”). 
 132. Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 27; APA Brief, supra note 16, at 3–4. 
 133. There are differences in brain maturation and cognitive abilities within the adolescent age 
group. However, in this Note, the term “adolescence” encompasses individuals from age twelve to 
twenty-five. See APA Brief, supra note 16, at 7–15; see, e.g., Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 3, 
at 27 (“[M]ost identity development takes place during the late teens and early twenties.”); 
Waterman, supra note 3, at 355 (“The most extensive advances in identity formation occur during 
the time spent in college.”). 
 134. See AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 3; see, e.g., Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. 
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 197 (1999). 
 135. See APA Brief, supra note 16, at 3–4; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 
(2005). 
(12) 53.1_TEASDALE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020  7:03 PM 
330 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:307 
their decision-making skills.136 As informed by research, and 
acknowledged in the courts, youthful offenders are less culpable than 
adult offenders.137 Thus, a youthful offender’s culpability for murder 
should not be based on their alleged reckless decision to engage in a 
felony, and the “reckless indifference” standard under the amended 
felony murder statute should not apply to adolescents. 
A.  Neuroscience: Structural and Functional Brain Development 
1.  The Prefrontal Cortex and the Amygdala 
Impulsivity is defined as the predisposition to rapidly override 
and discount goal-directing responses for inappropriate and/or more 
compelling thoughts and actions without regard for their negative 
consequences.138 Impulsivity includes minimal to zero decision-
making processes or forethought, aspects that are essential to decision-
making and culpability.139 
Psychological research indicates that impulse control and self-
management develops throughout childhood and early adulthood and 
that “expecting the experience-based ability to resist impulses . . . to 
be fully formed prior to age eighteen or nineteen would seem on 
present evidence to be wishful thinking.”140 This is because the 
prefrontal cortex is one of the last brain regions to mature, and the 
frontal lobes continue to develop until the mid-twenties.141 The 
prefrontal cortex controls planning, decision-making, risk assessment, 
voluntary behavior control, evaluation of reward and punishment, 
 
 136. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 2–11 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2013); Lucy C. 
Ferguson, The Implications of Developmental Cognitive Research on “Evolving Standards of 
Decency” and the Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 441, 458 (2004); 
(“Current empirical evidence from the behavioral sciences suggests that adolescents differ from 
adults and children in three important ways that lead to differences in behavior.”); AMA Brief, 
supra note 16, at 6–7; APA Brief, supra note 16, at 8–9. 
 137. See infra Sections III(A)–(C); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
 138. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 294; see AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 10; see, e.g., Beatriz 
Luna, The Maturation of Cognitive Control and the Adolescent Brain, in FROM ATTENTION TO 
GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR, 249, 250, 251 (F. Aboitiz & D. Cosmelli eds., 2009). 
 139. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 295. 
 140. APA Brief, supra note 16, at 10 (quoting Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for 
the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON 
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 271, 280, 282 (Thomas Grisso & 
Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000)); see Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent 
Risk-Taking, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 217 (2010). 
 141. B.J Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 62, 63–64 (2008); 
Buckingham, supra note 22, at 841; Steinberg, supra note 139, at 216. 
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impulse control, responses to criticism and affirmation, moral 
reasoning, and emotional regulation.142 Therefore, the prefrontal 
cortex’s large role in an individual’s decision-making process, in 
combination with its late development, hinders adolescents’ rational 
decision-making skills and causes them to act more impulsively than 
adults.143 
Further, the motivational system, which includes the amygdala, 
controls risky and reward-seeking behavior and develops more rapidly 
than the prefrontal cortex’s cognitive control system, which works to 
regulate behavior.144 Therefore, before the prefrontal cortex is fully 
developed, adolescents primarily rely on the amygdala when making 
decisions.145 
 The amygdala is associated with emotional impulsivity and 
aggressive behavior.146 It is a “neural system” that identifies danger 
and creates emotional responses to that danger quickly and 
reflexively.147 Reliance on the amygdala and motivational system 
correlates with the adolescent’s impulsivity, attraction to immediate 
rewards compared to long-term rewards, and weak ability to anticipate 
a decision’s consequences.148 
Controlling one’s impulses is essential to cognitive development, 
effective problem solving, and exercising good judgment.149 
 
 142. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE 
MIND 75 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the function of the frontal lobe of the brain); Antoine Bechara 
et al., Characterization of the Decision-Making Deficit of Patients with Ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex Lesions, 123 BRAIN 2189, 2198 (2000); Jorge Moll et al., Frontopolar and Anterior 
Temporal Cortex Activation in a Moral Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in 
Normal Subjects, 59 ARQ NEUROPSIQUIATR 657, 661 (2001) (discussing a study showing that 
moral judgments are made using the frontopolar cortex of the brain); Robert D. Rogers et al., 
Choosing Between Small, Likely Rewards and Large, Unlikely Rewards Activates Inferior and 
Orbital Prefrontal Cortex, 20 J. NEUROSCIENCE 9029, 9029 (1999) (concluding that studies show 
the orbital prefrontal cortex is linked to decision-making and risk-reward comprehension); AMA 
Brief, supra note 16, at 17–19; see B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain Development 
and Its Relation to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 244 (2000). 
 143. See AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 17–18; Buckingham, supra note 22, at 839–40; Flynn, 
supra note 84, at 1070. 
 144. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 29–30. 
 145. See id.; see also GAZZANIGA ET AL., supra note 142, at 553–73 (describing the amygdala 
and its connection to learned emotional responses). 
 146. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 30. 
 147. See id. at 31; ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES & THE 
CIVILIZED MIND 31 (2001) (describing the function of the amygdala and its “fight or flight” 
reaction). 
 148. See Feld, supra note 32, at 519–20. 
 149. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 10; see Luna, supra note 138, at 250, 251. 
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Consequently, adolescents’ diminished capability to reflect before 
they act, assess dangers, and foresee consequences distinguishes adult 
and adolescent culpability.150 
Similar to adolescents’ limited ability to control their impulses, 
adolescents struggle to regulate their emotional responses.151 
Individuals typically control their emotional responses to stimuli 
based on their behavioral goals.152 However, due to an overactive 
amygdala and an underdeveloped prefrontal cortex, the ability to 
regulate emotions develops throughout childhood and early 
adulthood, affecting adolescents’ ability to voluntarily, maturely, and 
effectively control their behavior and envision their goals.153 
As a result, adolescents’ heightened emotional responses limit 
their ability to make informed decisions, causing them to more likely 
engage in risky, impulsive, and irrational behavior without weighing 
the negative consequences of their actions.154 
2.  Myelination 
Myelination occurs during adolescence, which affects brain 
maturity.155 During myelination, neural fibers, called axons, are coated 
with a white fatty substance, called myelin, to carry information 
between different parts of the brain more quickly and reliably.156 
Myelination increases the efficiency of information processing and 
helps to integrate the frontal lobes with the areas of the brain that 
process emotions, rewards, and social information.157 This efficient 
connection, in turn, increases self-control, enhances decision-making 
skills, and improves resistance to peer pressure.158 Consequently, 
myelination, which continues until the mid-twenties, is positively 
 
 150. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 295. 
 151. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 11–12. 
 152. Id. at 11; see Sang Hee Kim & Stephan Hamann, Neural Correlates of Positive and 
Negative Emotion Regulation, 19 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 776, 776 (2007); Kelly Anne 
Barnes et al., Developmental Differences in Cognitive Control of Socio-Affective Processing, 32 
DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 787, 788 (2007). 
 153. See Feld, supra note 32, at 519–20; see also Casey et al., supra note 141, at 68. 
 154. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 816 
(2003); AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 12–13; see Feld, supra note 32, at 515 n.203. 
 155. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 25; APA Brief, supra note 16, at 25. 
 156. GAZZANIGA ET AL., supra note 142, at 31, 48–49; GOLDBERG, supra note 147, at 144. 
 157. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 26. 
 158. Id.; see Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 468 (2009). 
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correlated to an individual’s improved ability to self-regulate their 
emotions and behavior throughout adolescence.159 
3.  Pruning 
Pruning is the process by which the brain eliminates unused 
neural connections, called gray matter, so that the brain can function 
more efficiently.160 As the brain prunes gray matter, information 
processing is strengthened, supporting improved risk assessment, 
impulse control, decision-making, and emotional regulation.161 
Without coincidence, pruning reaches its peak between ages ten and 
twenty, and the prefrontal cortex, the region most associated with 
controlling behavior, is one of the last regions in the brain where 
pruning is complete.162 
Research into the brain’s structures and functions indicate that an 
adolescent’s brain is not as mature or functional as that of an adult.163 
Consequently, adolescents are less able to self-regulate and 
cognitively control their behavior, leading to impulsive and reckless 
decisions.164 Along with the psychological analysis presented below, 
this research indicates that adolescent offenders are not as culpable as 
adult offenders and should be treated accordingly. 
B.  Developmental Psychology 
1.  Outside Influence 
Adolescents’ ability to control their impulsive behavior and 
regulate their emotions is highly undermined by peer pressure, trauma, 
and authoritative influence.165 Vulnerability to peer pressure and 
authoritative influence derives from adolescents’ poor self-reliance 
and underdeveloped self-concept.166 Peer pressure is powerful because 
adolescents crave validation from others, making it more difficult for 
them to form an independent identity and set of values and making it 
 
 159. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 26; see Zoltan Nagy et al., Maturation of White Matter is 
Associated with the Development of Cognitive Functions During Childhood, 16 J. COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE 1227, 1231–32 (2004). 
 160. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 21; Buckingham, supra note 22, at 841. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Buckingham, supra note 22, at 841. 
 163. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 6–7. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 295–96. 
 166. Id. at 295. 
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easy for others to influence their decisions and behavior.167 As a result, 
peer pressure prevents adolescents from fully considering the 
consequences and risks involved in their actions.168 
A study by Margo Gardner and Laurence Steinberg found that 
when exposed to peers during a risk-taking task, adolescents doubled 
the amount of risky behavior that they engaged in, and even college 
undergraduates’ risky behavior increased by 50 percent.169 
Adolescents both act as a direct response to pressure from peers 
and authoritative figures and make decisions as an indirect response 
to their desire for approval and fear of rejection.170 This influence 
causes adolescents to engage in more risky behavior, even in the 
absence of direct pressure.171 Undoubtedly, adolescents tend to 
reflexively comply with authoritative figures because of their assumed 
superior status, leading adolescents to make decisions based on 
authoritative demands rather than logical reasoning or independent 
judgment.172 
Moreover, when adolescents are exposed to stress and trauma, it 
is even more difficult for them to rationally regulate their behavior and 
make informed decisions.173 Adolescents are more sensitive to even 
daily events, making adolescents more “emotionally volatile” than 
both adults and young children.174 As a result, adolescents are not as 
capable of behaving as subjectively or objectively rational as adults. 
2.  Decision-Making 
Adolescents are highly sensitive to emotional and social stimuli 
and, thus, less capable of making mature and thoughtful decisions than 
adults.175 Adolescents are sensation-seeking and, therefore, choose to 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 12; Buckingham, supra note 22, at 834; see also Laurence 
Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531, 1531–32 (2007). 
 169. Steinberg, supra note 158, at 468–69 n.70 (citing Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, 
Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and 
Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 626–34 (2005)). 
 170. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 296. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Linda Patia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 423 (2000). 
 174. Id. at 429. 
 175. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 293; see, e.g., Dustin Albert & Laurence Steinberg, 
Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence, 21 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 211, 217 (2011) 
(explaining that socioemotional stimuli has an impact on adolescent decision-making). 
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engage in certain behavior because of its desirable emotional 
outcomes and immediate rewards, despite its possible risks.176 This 
sensation and reward-seeking behavior intensifies from childhood to 
adolescence and declines through the mid-twenties.177 This heightened 
sensitivity makes adolescents less capable of predicting and 
appreciating negative consequences and more likely to engage in risky 
and criminal behavior than adults.178 Further, adolescents have little 
life experience, which typically conditions an individual to engage in 
long-term planning and cost-benefit analysis.179 In sum, adolescents’ 
hindered ability to rationally make decisions during development 
supports the idea that adolescents are less culpable than adults for the 
decisions that they make. 
C.  Transitory Nature 
Because adolescence is characterized as a time of rapid and 
intense change in terms of biology, emotions, cognition, and social 
relationships, adolescents’ developmental immaturity is transitory in 
nature and ultimately ends in adulthood.180 Similarly, adolescents’ 
tendency toward reckless, risky, and criminal behavior declines as 
they get older.181 
Numerous studies show that as risk-taking behavior peaks in 
adolescence, so does criminal engagement, and both decline 
simultaneously thereafter.182 Only a small percentage—5 to 10 
percent—of juvenile offenders become “chronic” youthful offenders 
who continue offending into adulthood.183 Therefore, the large 
majority of youthful offenders do not grow up to become adult 
criminals, but instead, they are capable of parting with their criminal 
 
 176. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 294; AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 5–8. 
 177. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 294. 
 178. AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 7–8. 
 179. APA Brief, supra note 16, at 11–12; Buckingham, supra note 22, at 836, 840. 
 180. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 297. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Elizabeth Caufman et al., How Developmental Science Influences Juvenile Justice Reform, 
8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 21, 26 (2018). 
 183. Id.; Levick et al., supra note 16, at 298–99 (citing a three-year study that followed over 
one thousand serious male offenders charged with felonies and only found 8.7 percent of the 
participants to be “persistent” offenders). 
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behavior and integrating successfully into society without 
intervention.184 
IV.  RECENT TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM 
A.  United States Supreme Court Decisions 
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has made decisions that 
have monumentally advanced juvenile justice reform.185 The Court 
was guided by the neuroscience and psychology research outlining 
that the differences in adolescent and adult brain development 
diminish youthful offenders’ culpability and support reduced or 
limited punishments and increased constitutional protections for 
youthful offenders.186 
1.  Roper v. Simmons 
The first landmark decision was Roper v. Simmons,187 which 
outlawed the death penalty for individuals who are under eighteen 
when the crime is committed.188 The Court recognized that maturity 
differences between adult and youthful offenders make it impossible 
for minors to be considered among the worst offenders.189 
Christopher Simmons was seventeen years old when he planned 
a murder with his two friends.190 Just nine months after the crime, he 
was sentenced to death.191 On appeal, Simmons argued that under 
Atkins v. Virginia192 the death penalty is unconstitutional when applied 
to juveniles under eighteen, just as it was found unconstitutional when 
applied to the mentally disabled.193 The Missouri Supreme Court 
agreed with Simmons and granted his appeal.194 Justice Kennedy, 
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, affirmed, 
 
 184. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 298; see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–73 
(2012) (“Deciding that a ‘juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society’ would require 
‘mak[ing] a judgment that [he] is incorrigible’—but ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’”). 
 185. Root, supra note 42, at 32. 
 186. Id. 
 187. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 188. Id. at 578. 
 189. Id. at 570. 
 190. Id. at 556. 
 191. Id. 
 192. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 193. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 194. Id. at 413. 
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finding that sentencing minors to the death penalty violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.195 
Justice Kennedy outlined three important distinctions between 
minors and adults.196 He plainly stated,  
[First], as any parent knows and as the scientific and 
sociological studies respondent and his amici cite tend to 
confirm, “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense 
of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults 
and are more understandable among the young. These 
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions 
and decisions.” It has been noted that “adolescents are 
overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of 
reckless behavior.”197  
Second, the Court explained that “juveniles are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,” and third, 
their character “is not as well formed as that of an adult” and their 
personality traits are “less fixed.”198 
These three distinctions, the Court said, naturally support the idea 
that juveniles’ irresponsible conduct is not as “morally reprehensible” 
as adults’, and even the most heinous conduct does not evidence 
“irretrievably depraved character” in a juvenile.199 Justice Kennedy 
concluded that it would be morally misguided to equate the culpability 
of an adult and a juvenile when science indicates that juveniles’ 
diminished risk assessment and reckless and impulsive behavior are 
transitory.200 Even more compelling, the Court stated, is that the 
justifications for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, are 
inadequate when applied to juveniles.201 The harshest punishments are 
reserved for the worst offenders, which undoubtedly are not youthful 
offenders,202 and adolescents lack the heightened ability to weigh the 
 
 195. Roper, 543 U.S. at 554, 578–79. 
 196. Id. at 569–70. 
 197. Id. at 569 (citation omitted). 
 198. Id. at 569–70. 
 199. Id. at 570. 
 200. Id. (quoting Steinberg & Scott, supra note 22, at 1014) (“For most teens, [risky or 
antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with maturity as individual identity becomes 
settled. Only a relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal 
activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood . . . .”). 
 201. Id. at 571–72. 
 202. Id. at 569 (“[D]ifferences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile 
offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”). 
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risks and envision the negative consequences of their actions, making 
deterrence ineffective.203 
2.  Graham v. Florida 
The Court in Graham v. Florida204 used the same rationale as it 
did in Roper when it held that juvenile non-homicide offenders cannot 
be sentenced to life in prison without parole (LWOP).205 When 
Terrance Jamar Graham was sixteen, he and three of his friends 
attempted to rob a restaurant.206 When Graham and one of his 
accomplices got inside, the accomplice struck the restaurant manager 
in the back of the head with a metal bar, and the two boys escaped in 
a getaway car driven by the third perpetrator.207 Graham pled guilty 
and received three years of probation, one of which he served in 
county jail.208 Less than six months after his release, seventeen-year-
old Graham was involved in a home invasion and an attempted armed 
robbery.209 The trial court found that Graham violated his probation 
and sentenced him to life imprisonment for the armed burglary, and 
fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery, the equivalent to LWOP 
in the state of Florida.210 Graham appealed, arguing that his sentence 
was a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.211 
The Court first looked at sentencing practices across the United 
States and found that only eleven jurisdictions imposed LWOP on 
juvenile non-homicide offenders, indicating a national consensus 
against the practice.212 The Court also reviewed the international 
consensus and found that the United States was the only nation that 
imposed LWOP on juvenile non-homicide offenders and, along with 
Somalia, was the only nation that had not ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits such 
 
 203. Id. at 572. 
 204. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 205. Id. at 68–69, 82. 
 206. Id. at 53. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 54. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 55, 57. 
 211. Id. at 58. 
 212. Id. at 62, 64 (“[T]here are 123 juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving life without parole 
sentences. A significant majority of those, 77 in total, are serving sentences imposed in Florida. 
The other 46 are imprisoned in just 10 States—California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia.”). 
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sentencing against juveniles.213 Justice Kennedy explained that, while 
national and international consensuses are not the only justifications 
for abolishing a United States law, they are “entitled to great weight” 
and provide a “respected and significant confirmation” of the Court’s 
conclusions.214 
Justice Kennedy then used the scientific evidence analyzed in 
Roper to conclude, “[W]hen compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile 
offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral 
culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each 
bear on the analysis.”215 The Court pointed out that psychology and 
neuroscience research show that the parts of the brain that regulate 
behavior continue to mature through late adolescence, making it 
“misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for 
a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be 
reformed.”216 Moreover, the characteristic deficiencies in adolescents 
are so impactful that it makes it difficult for even psychologists to 
differentiate between youthful offenders whose crimes are a result of 
the transient nature of an adolescent’s immaturity, or the “rare juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”217 
Referencing Roper, Justice Kennedy stated that “because 
juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most 
severe punishments.”218 Ultimately, the Court found that a categorical 
prohibition on LWOP would give juvenile nonhomicide offenders the 
chance to rehabilitate and incentivize them to become responsible 
individuals when they reenter society.219 As the Court wrote, “criminal 
procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account 
at all would be flawed.”220 
Though the Court did not address how this analysis can apply to 
felony murder, applying the same logic to the new California standard, 
a juvenile considered to have “reckless indifference to human life” still 
has a twice-diminished moral culpability.221 Their culpability is once 
 
 213. Id. at 81. 
 214. Id. at 67, 81. 
 215. Id. at 68–69 (emphasis added). 
 216. Id. at 68. 
 217. Id. at 72–73. 
 218. Id. at 68. 
 219. Id. at 79. 
 220. Id. at 76. 
 221. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2019). 
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diminished by their age, and twice diminished because they did not 
kill or have intent to kill. 
3.  J.D.B. v. North Carolina 
A year later, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina,222 the Supreme Court 
found that an individual’s age also informs the Miranda analysis when 
deciding whether a reasonable person would believe that they were 
free to terminate a police interrogation and leave.223 J.D.B. was a 
thirteen-year-old student who was pulled out of class and interrogated 
by four adults, including a uniformed police officer and a juvenile 
investigator with the local police force.224 They questioned J.D.B. for 
around thirty minutes about a recent home break-in that occurred in 
the neighborhood.225 Although the adults knew his age, no one called 
his grandmother or read him his Miranda rights prior to 
questioning.226 After J.D.B. denied his involvement in the alleged 
break-in, the investigator pressed J.D.B. to “do the right thing” and 
warned that the investigator may need to get a secure custody order if 
he thought J.D.B. would continue to break into homes.227 Fearing 
juvenile detention from the court order, J.D.B. confessed that he and 
his friend were responsible for the break-ins.228 It was not until J.D.B. 
confessed that the investigator told him that he could refuse to answer 
the investigator’s questions and was free to leave.229 When asked if he 
understood, J.D.B. nodded and continued giving details about the 
crime.230 
In analyzing whether age has any place in custody analysis, 
Justice Sotomayor did not point to scientific research, instead 
concluding that youth is an objective circumstance that “generates 
commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception” and that 
failing to consider a suspect’s age is in the custody analysis is 
“nonsensical.”231 The Court highlighted the accepted view in “[a]ll 
American jurisdictions . . . that a person’s childhood is a relevant 
 
 222. 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
 223. Id. at 277. 
 224. Id. at 265–66. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 266. 
 228. Id. at 267. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 272, 275 (emphasis added). 
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circumstance” in determining the reasonable person standard.232 Just 
as the Supreme Court has reasoned time and time again, Justice 
Sotomayor explained that children are “less mature and responsible 
than adults . . . lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to 
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,” and 
are more vulnerable to outside pressures.233 The Court in J.D.B. 
concluded that age is an essential factor in determining the mindset of 
a reasonable person and is routinely considered when determining 
liability in the torts context because a diminished capacity warrants 
extra protections.234 
The decision in J.D.B. is significant because, regardless of what 
complicated scientific research concludes about the psychological and 
cognitive differences between adolescents and adults, it is simply 
commonsense that adolescents are different than adults and should be 
held to a different culpability standard. Using this commonsense, 
Justice Sotomayor still came to the same conclusion as the Court in 
Roper, in Graham, and, later, in Miller v. Alabama235: adolescents’ 
immaturity provides the justification for treating them differently from 
adults, not only in sentencing but in all aspects of the criminal justice 
system.236 
4.  Miller v. Alabama 
In the most recent Supreme Court decision concerning juvenile 
justice, Miller v. Alabama,237 the Court made a monumental decision 
to outlaw sentencing structures that mandate LWOP for juvenile 
homicide offenders.238 The Court found that sentencing courts instead 
 
 232. Id. at 274. 
 233. Id. at 272 (citations omitted). 
 234. Id. at 274–76. 
 235. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 236. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 271–72; Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 569 (2005) (stating that one reason adolescents have a diminished culpability compared to 
adults is because “children have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ 
leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
68 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570) (“As compared to adults, juveniles have a ‘lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible 
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not 
as well formed.’”). 
 237. The decision was based on two cases, Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757 (Ark. 2004), and 
E.J.M. v. State, 928 So. 2d 1077 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte E.J.M. v. State, 
928 So. 2d 1081 (Ala. 2005), that the Court consolidated into one opinion. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465, 
468. 
 238. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. 
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must first consider the individual’s age and the nature of the crime, 
youthful characteristics, background, and mental development.239 In 
addition to their young age, both Miller and Jackson were subject to 
trauma in their living environments, and both committed acts in the 
presence of peers, making them more vulnerable to negative influence 
and criminal behavior.240 
Kuntrell Jackson was fourteen years old when he and two other 
boys attempted to rob a video store.241 Jackson had a violent family 
background, with both his mother and grandmother having previously 
shot individuals.242 On the way to the store, Jackson learned that one 
of his accomplices was carrying a sawed-off shotgun.243 Jackson 
decided to stay outside while the other boys entered the store.244 One 
boy pointed the gun at the store clerk and the other demanded that the 
clerk “give up the money.”245 A few moments later, Jackson entered 
the store, and, “at trial, the parties disputed whether Jackson warned 
[the store clerk] that ‘[w]e ain’t playin’,’ or instead told his friends, ‘I 
thought you all was playin’.”246 After the clerk threatened to call the 
police, the boy with the gun shot and killed her.247 
Miller was also fourteen years old at the time of his crime.248 He 
had been in and out of foster care, his mother suffered from alcoholism 
and drug addiction, and his stepfather physically abused him.249 He 
also regularly used drugs and alcohol and had previously attempted 
suicide four times, the first time at six years old.250 
One night Miller was home with his friend when his neighbor 
delivered drugs to Miller’s mother.251 After the drug deal, Miller and 
his friend went to his neighbor’s trailer to drink and smoke 
marijuana.252 After the neighbor passed out, Miller stole his wallet.253 
 
 239. Id. at 477, 489. 
 240. See id. at 478–79. 
 241. Id. at 465. 
 242. Id. at 478. 
 243. Id. at 465. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 466. 
 248. Id. at 467. 
 249. Id. at 467. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 468. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
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When Miller attempted to put the wallet back in the neighbor’s pocket, 
the neighbor woke up and grabbed Miller by the throat.254 Miller’s 
friend hit the neighbor with a baseball bat, which Miller eventually 
joined in on.255 To cover up their crime, the boys went back to the 
trailer and lit two fires.256 The neighbor eventually died from smoke 
inhalation and his other injuries.257 
Both Jackson and Miller were tried as adults, and both Arkansas 
and Alabama law mandated that Jackson258 and Miller259 serve 
LWOP. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, and 
reversed both sentences260 after analyzing the scientific evidence 
presented, the precedent set in Roper, Graham, and J.D.B., and the 
American Psychological Association’s brief.261 Again, as in Roper, 
the Court found that there are three significant differences between 
adults and developing adolescents that diminish adolescents’ 
culpability.262 
The Court concluded that the mandatory sentencing schemes at 
issue were flawed because they sentenced defendants to one of the 
most severe punishments without considering a central element when 
considering culpability: age.263 Sentencing schemes that impose one 
of the harshest prison sentences without considering youth and youth’s 
characteristics pose a great risk of disproportionate punishment, 
 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 466. Jackson was charged with capital felony murder and aggravated robbery. Id. 
The judge stated, “[I]n view of [the] verdict, there’s only one possible punishment . . . ,” and 
sentenced him to LWOP. Id. (alteration in original). 
 259. Id. at 468–69. The State charged Miller with murder in the course of arson, which carries 
a mandatory minimum sentence of LWOP. Id. at 469. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 470, 472 n.5. The Court found that the evidence of science and social science had 
become even stronger since Roper and Graham. Id. The Court quoted the APA brief, which said 
that it was “increasingly clear that adolescent brains are not fully mature in regions and systems 
related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk 
avoidance.” Id. 
 262. Id. at 471 (“First, children have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility,’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Second, children ‘are 
more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,’ including from their family and 
peers; they have limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the ability to extricate 
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child’s character is not as ‘well 
formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of 
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)). 
 263. Id. at 474, 476. 
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ultimately requiring the same sentence for fourteen-year-old neglected 
and abused children as forty-five-year-old, fully developed adults.264 
In the concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice 
Sotomayor, went further and stated that juvenile homicide offenders 
should never be punished with LWOP if they do not kill or intend to 
kill the victim.265 Justice Breyer quoted Graham, which found that 
juvenile offenders “who did not kill or intend to kill [have] twice 
diminished moral culpability” because of (1) the lack of intent; and (2) 
the lack of maturity and sense of responsibility, vulnerability to 
outside pressure, and undeveloped character “twice diminishes” their 
culpability.266 The Justices recognized that felony murder cases are 
complicated because the question of intent is traditionally based on the 
intent to commit the felony.267 However, they still found that the 
“transferred intent” is not sufficient to subject a juvenile to the harshest 
type of punishment.268 
First, the Supreme Court does not recognize transferred intent for 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.269 Graham’s holding strongly 
implies that those who have a reckless indifference to human life are 
ineligible for LWOP because only those who kill or intend to kill can 
be constitutionally sentenced to LWOP.270 Second, imposing the 
harshest sentence on a developing adolescent who did not kill or intend 
to kill makes no logical sense. Justice Breyer accurately stated: 
At base, the theory of transferring a defendant’s intent is 
premised on the idea that one engaged in a dangerous felony 
should understand the risk that the victim of the felony could 
be killed, even by a confederate. Yet the ability to consider 
the full consequences of a course of action and to adjust one’s 
conduct accordingly is precisely what we know juveniles 
lack capacity to do effectively.271 
Ultimately, because of Jackson’s twice-diminished culpability, 
Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor would not have found Jackson 
 
 264. Id. at 477, 479. 
 265. Id. at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 266. Id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010)). 
 267. Id. at 491. 
 268. Id.  
 269. Id.; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (forbidding capital punishment 
for an aider and abettor in a robbery, where that individual did not intend to kill and simply was “in 
the car by the side of the road . . . , waiting to help the robbers escape”). 
 270. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 491–92 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 69. 
 271. Miller, 567 U.S. at 492. 
(12) 53.1_TEASDALE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2020  7:03 PM 
2019] THE CALIFORNIA FELONY MURDER RULE 345 
eligible for LWOP, absent a finding that he killed or intended to kill 
the store clerk.272 It follows that, when applied to adolescents, the 
felony murder rule’s “reckless indifference standard” is based on even 
more fallacious reasoning than when applied to adults. The concurring 
opinion has powerful implications for the felony-murder rule’s future 
application to adolescents and further supports that the new California 
standard of “reckless indifference,” which does not involve a direct 
killing or intent to kill, is inappropriate when applied to adolescents. 
5.  Montgomery v. Louisiana 
In Montgomery v. Louisiana,273 the Supreme Court reviewed the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision that Miller v. Alabama did not 
apply retroactively.274 When a case creates a substantive constitutional 
rule, the Constitution requires that the state collateral review court 
give the rule retroactive effect.275 A new substantive constitutional 
rule includes both rules that forbid “criminal punishment of certain 
primary conduct” and prohibit “a certain category of punishment for a 
class of defendants because of their statutes or offense.”276 The United 
States Supreme Court held that the Miller holding was a new 
substantive rule that prohibited LWOP for juvenile offenders whose 
crimes reflect “the transient immaturity” of youth.277 Therefore, the 
Miller rule applies to cases even if the offender was already convicted 
and sentenced.278 Though the required hearing considering the 
sentencing factors is necessary to differentiate those whose crimes 
reflect a transient immaturity, and is procedural in nature, the hearing 
only gives effect to Miller’s substantive holding.279 
The Court agreed that many crimes committed by minors are a 
result of their temporary developmental immaturity, rather than an 
“irreparable corruption.”280 Due to youthful offenders’ diminished 
culpability, and large capacity for change, they are constitutionally 
different from adults, and the need to sentence youthful offenders to 
 
 272. Id. at 493. 
 273. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 274. Id. at 727. 
 275. Id. at 729. 
 276. Id. at 732. 
 277. Id. at 735. 
 278. See id. at 731. 
 279. Id. at 735. 
 280. See id. at 734. 
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the harshest sentences possible is highly uncommon.281 This holding 
is important because the Court recognized that considering the 
vulnerability and immaturity of a youthful offender is absolutely 
essential when determining culpability and punishments, and that 
courts should not exclude youthful offenders, whether their 
convictions are final or not, from receiving the protections that the 
Constitution affords them.282 In light of the realization that LWOP 
sentences are almost always illogical when applied to minors, the 
Montgomery decision results in fewer LWOP sentences for minors.283 
B.  Changes in California Law 
1.  Proposition 57: The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 
Proposition 57 was passed in the November 2016 election and 
altered juvenile criminal procedure under the California Welfare and 
Institutions Code (CWIC).284 Prior to Proposition 57, prosecutors had 
the discretion to charge juveniles in a court of criminal jurisdiction 
(“adult court”), rather than in a juvenile court, as long as the juvenile 
was at least fourteen years old and committed a serious enumerated 
crime.285 The law did not require the court to first consider relevant 
factors related to culpability, such as the circumstances of the crime, 
the juvenile’s mental health, community and familial environment, or 
the possibility of rehabilitation.286 Instead, this evaluation was 
discretionary.287 
 
 281. Id. at 733–34. 
 282. See id. at 736. 
 283. Id. at 736–37. 
 284. OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2016, GENERAL ELECTION supra note 11, at 
141–44. 
 285. Id. at 142 (allowing transfers “in any case in which a minor is alleged to be a person 
described in subdivision (a) of Section 602 by reason of the violation, when he or she was 16 years 
of age or older, of any felony criminal statute, or ordinance except those listed in subdivision (b), 
or of an offense listed in subdivision (b) when he or she was 14 or 15 years of age”). Reducing the 
likelihood that a juvenile is transferred to adult court is important because in adult court, they are 
more likely to receive harsher and longer sentences than they would have in juvenile court. Edward 
P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: Effects of a Broad Policy in 
One Court, JUVENILE JUST. BULL., (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, D.C.) 
Dec. 2012 at 1, 3, https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/232932.pdf. Further, after being sentenced, placing 
minors in adult prisons exposes them to heightened risk of physical, sexual, and psychological 
victimization, and harmful disruptions in their cognitive development. Id. at 1, 2. 
 286. See OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2016, GENERAL ELECTION supra note  
11284 at 142. 
 287. See id. 
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Under Proposition 57, and the amended CWIC section 707, if a 
prosecutor wishes to charge a juvenile in adult court, the prosecutor 
must first make a motion to transfer the juvenile, and the juvenile court 
must order a probation report on the juvenile’s behavioral patterns and 
social history.288 Following the consideration of the report and other 
relevant evidence the parties wish to submit, the juvenile court must 
consider the mitigating criteria specified in the statute before deciding 
whether the juvenile should be transferred.289 In addition to the 
relevant factors listed above, the court must consider the minor’s 
maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and 
emotional health at the time of the alleged offense, the 
minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences of criminal behavior, the effect of familial, 
adult, or peer pressure on the minor’s actions . . . [and] the 
minor’s potential to grow and mature.290 
The required factors considered under CWIC section 707 are 
primarily composed of the behavioral traits and cognitive abilities 
addressed in adolescent developmental research. In proposing the bill, 
it is clear that the legislature recognized the cognitive differences 
between adolescents and adults and how important these differences 
are when evaluating a youthful offender’s culpability. Similarly 
noteworthy, among the voters’ purposes for approving the bill was to 
“stop the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, 
especially for juveniles.”291 
2.  People v. Contreras: Sentencing Juvenile Nonhomicide Offenders 
to Lengthy Sentences Violates the Eighth Amendment 
In People v. Contreras,292 sixteen-year-old defendants Contreras 
and Rodriguez forcibly raped a fifteen-year-old female and a sixteen-
year-old female.293 Rodriguez was sentenced to fifty years to life, and 
Contreras was sentenced to fifty-eight years to life.294 The California 
Supreme Court decided that sentencing juvenile nonhomicide 
 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. The statute includes a larger list of factors and evaluative procedures not quoted above, 
and the court can consider additional factors not enumerated in the statute. 
 291. Id. at 141. 
 292. 411 P.3d 445 (Cal. 2018). 
 293. Id. at 446. 
 294. Id. 
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offenders who committed sex offenses to lengthy sentences violates 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, ultimately extending the ruling in Graham.295 
As a starting point, the Contreras court adopted the Graham 
Court’s consideration of the offender’s culpability “in light of their 
crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment 
in question.”296 The court supported its holding with the three salient 
characteristics outlined in Roper and Graham that differentiate the 
culpability between juveniles and adults.297 Further, while this case 
involved nonhomicide offenders, as Graham did, the court 
differentiated nonhomicide offenders by describing them as those who 
do not “kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken” and agreed 
that they are “categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of 
punishment than are murderers.”298 The court reasoned that when 
these types of offenders are juveniles, they have a “twice diminished 
moral culpability”299 because juveniles have a “limited ability to 
consider consequences when making decisions.”300 
In the end, the court found that youths’ lack of maturity and their 
prospect for future rehabilitation warrant a prohibition of lengthy 
sentences against nonhomicide offenders.301 The court stated that, 
though fifty years is less harsh than LWOP, it is still “‘an especially 
harsh punishment for a juvenile,’ who ‘will on average serve more 
years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult 
offender.’”302 The court asserted that Graham ultimately prohibited 
“states from making the judgment at the outset that . . . [juvenile] 
offenders never will be fit to reenter society.”303 In recognizing that 
juveniles possess the capacity for change, the court stated that the 
prospect of rehabilitation is not only a factor of juveniles’ transient 
qualities of youth but also depends on the opportunities available to 
 
 295. Id. at 446, 448. 
 296. Id. at 451–52. 
 297. Id. at 452 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (“[A]s compared to adults, 
juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure’; 
and their characters are ‘not as well formed.’”). 
 298. Id. at 452 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). 
 299. Id. at 454 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). 
 300. Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). 
 301. Id. at 463. 
 302. Id. at 454 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 70). 
 303. Id. at 453 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). 
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juveniles when released.304 This means that juveniles should have 
access to rehabilitation services, such as vocational training and 
education.305 Additionally, if a juvenile is given a sentence that leaves 
them with no chance to leave prison for fifty or more years, a juvenile 
“has little incentive to become a responsible individual.”306 The court 
in Contreras ultimately recognized that sentencing less culpable 
juveniles to lengthy sentences circumvents the goals of the juvenile 
justice system and found its decision consistent with state legislation 
adopted in the wake of Graham and Miller.307 
3.  S.B. 1391: Prohibiting Prosecutors from Prosecuting Juveniles as 
Adults if They Are Under Age Sixteen 
In September 2018, S.B. 1391 was passed to further the intent of 
Proposition 57 and amend section 707 of the CWIC once again.308 As 
explained above, under Proposition 57, prosecutors could still make a 
motion to transfer minors from juvenile court to adult court if the 
minor was at least fourteen years old and was alleged to have 
committed a specified serious offense.309 SB 1391 completely 
repealed prosecutors’ authority to make a transfer motion for a 
fourteen- or fifteen-year-old offender unless the individual who 
committed the crime at fourteen or fifteen was apprehended when they 
were no longer within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction (eighteen years 
old or older).310 In sum, prosecutors are essentially prohibited from 
prosecuting juveniles as adults if they are under age sixteen.311 
Along with signing S.B. 1391, Governor Jerry Brown issued a 
message explaining that he studied the research, data, and legislative 
history relevant to the bill, and ultimately concluded: 
 
 304. Id. at 454 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 79). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 79). 
 307. Id. at 463. One piece of legislation the court cited was S.B. 394. Id. The bill extended 
California Penal Code section 3051 so that individuals convicted of an offense committed before 
they were eighteen years old and sentenced to LWOP are eligible for parole after their twenty-fifth 
year of incarceration. S.B. 394, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 308. S.B. 1391, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 309. See supra Section IV(B)(1). 
 310. S.B. 1391, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 311. See OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2016, GENERAL ELECTION supra note 11, 
at 142. S.B. 1391 deleted the language allowing prosecutors to charge a fourteen- or fifteen-year-
old minor for specific crimes and only left the section that allows prosecutors to charge sixteen-
year-olds, unless they were eighteen or older when they were apprehended. 
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There is a fundamental principle at stake here: whether we 
want a society which at least attempts to reform the youngest 
offenders before cosigning them to adult prisons where their 
likelihood of becoming a lifelong criminal is so much higher. 
My view is that we should continue to work toward a more 
just system that respects victims, protects public safety, holds 
youth accountable, and also seeks a path of redemption and 
reformation wherever possible.312 
Governor Brown cited to the undisputed transitory nature of 
juveniles’ reckless behavior and criminal tendencies to promote the 
well-reasoned idea that juveniles are the most capable of 
rehabilitation.313 
C.  SB 439: Individuals Under Age Twelve Cannot 
Be Charged for Most Crimes 
Previously, CWIC section 602 read that any minor under eighteen 
was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Under S.B. 439, 
signed by Governor Jerry Brown in September 2018, the individual 
must now be between twelve and seventeen years of age, inclusive, to 
fall within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or be adjudged a ward 
of the court.314 
Instead of wasting resources arresting and placing minors under 
twelve years old in the juvenile justice system, under the bill, counties 
are required to develop alternative child-serving systems to better 
address the underlying reasons for minors’ alleged offenses.315 These 
systems include child welfare, education, health care, or human 
services.316 In requiring additional rehabilitative programs, the 
 




 313. See id. 
 314. S.B. 439, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). There is an exception for minors under 
age twelve that are alleged to have committed murder or rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual 
penetration by force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm. These offenders would still be within 
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Id. 
 315. S.B. 439, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Holly J. Mitchell & Ricardo Lara, SB 
439 Fact Sheet (Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/sb_439_-
_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 316. S.B. 439, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Mitchell & Lara, supra note 315. 
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legislation has recognized that psychological and developmental 
factors contribute to a juvenile’s criminal tendency.317 
V.  LIMITING THE FELONY MURDER RULE 
WHEN APPLIED TO ADOLESCENTS 
A.  The Current Law Conflicts with Adolescent 
Development Research 
S.B. 1437 was intended to diminish the effects of transferred 
intent. Narrowing the scope of the rule makes it less likely that a 
perpetrator will be charged with an unintentional killing. The prior 
felony murder rule only required proof of the murderous act and the 
intent to commit the felony, but did not require intent to commit the 
killing.318 In contrast, S.B. 1437 requires that the perpetrator fit one of 
the specified sections in 189(e) of the California Penal Code before 
being charged with first-degree murder.319 
However, transferred intent is still inherent in the statute. Under 
the third possible mental state that confers felony murder culpability, 
the statute looks to the perpetrator’s major participation in the 
underlying felony, not in the killing.320 Further, the court analyzes the 
perpetrator’s reckless indifference in participating in the felony, not 
the killing, because the individual ultimately did not intend to kill.321 
Therefore, the prosecution can still piggyback on the perpetrator’s 
felony to get to a murder charge and—even more illogical—a first-
degree murder charge.322 
As proven by scientific research, and recognized by federal and 
California law, adolescents have a diminished mental capacity, and 
consequently diminished culpability compared to adults.323 The 
 
 317. Mitchell & Lara, supra note 315. 
 318. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2014) (prior to S.B. 1437, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2018)). 
 319. S.B. 1437, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 320. Id. (“The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless 
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Research on adolescent development strongly supports the idea that adolescents do not 
possess a true conscious regard for the danger of their actions compared to adults, which could 
support the proposition that second-degree murder should not apply to adolescents. However, this 
Note does not intend to take a position on that argument. The main problem with the felony murder 
rule is that it gives prosecutors the ability to punish an adolescent with the worst possible offense, 
first-degree murder, when the adolescent possesses a twice diminished capacity. 
 323. See supra Parts II–IV. 
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findings from Roper have been quoted time and time again to justify 
reduced sentencing and increased protections for adolescents in the 
criminal justice system.324 First, as the Court stated, adolescents have 
an “underdeveloped sense of responsibility” compared to adults, 
which “results in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions.”325 Second, adolescents “are more vulnerable or susceptible 
to negative influences and outside pressures” because they have “less 
control . . . over their own environment.”326 Third, adolescents’ 
character is not as well formed as that of adults.327 As a result, 
adolescents’ behavior is less “morally reprehensible.”328 
Following the same logic, adolescents should not be charged with 
the most morally reprehensible crime, first-degree murder, based on a 
characteristic proven by science to be inherent in adolescents: reckless 
indifference. Adolescents are far less likely than adults to consider or 
plan for the consequences of their actions.329 Even if an adolescent 
was to weigh the positive and negative consequences of committing a 
felony, the adolescent’s heightened sensitivity to immediate rewards 
outweighs their consideration of the potential risks involved, making 
them more indifferent to the potential dangers of the crime.330 
Further, the influence of others increases the likelihood that 
adolescents will engage in risky behavior and is especially important 
in the context of felony murder.331 Felony murder is based on applying 
the murderous behavior of one party to the other parties involved in 
the felony. Because adolescents have a difficult time defying peers and 
ultimately engaging in independent thought processes when faced with 
outside pressures, it is irrational to charge an adolescent with a first-
degree murder committed by another because they recklessly engaged 
in the underlying felony.332 In a multi-perpetrator crime, adolescents 
are even more likely to possess reckless indifference because they are 
 
 324. See supra Part IV. 
 325. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 
367 (1993). 
 326. Id. (citations omitted). 
 327. Id. at 570. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 295. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See id. at 296. 
 332. Root, supra note 42, at 64. 
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not only suffering from developmental immaturity but the mere 
presence of peers further diminishes their decision-making skills.333 
As described above, reckless indifference is found where the 
perpetrator “appreciated that their acts were likely to result in” death, 
or could have “kn[own] death was likely to occur.”334 Therefore, under 
California’s new felony murder rule, an adolescent can be sentenced 
to the harshest penalty next to death, life in prison, for failing to 
appreciate the serious consequences of their reckless actions.335 This 
“reckless indifference” standard is flawed because science and the 
courts have found that adolescents cannot necessarily foresee the 
consequences of their actions and that, instead, adolescents innately 
behave recklessly.336 As a result, an adolescent should not be charged 
with first-degree murder for possessing a reckless mental state. 
The existing California Penal Code already provides adequate 
criminal charges for adolescents involved in a murder without the need 
for a felony murder provision. For example, if the adolescent engaged 
in a premeditated, deliberate, and willful killing, the state can charge 
the adolescent with first-degree murder.337 If the prosecutor can prove 
that the adolescent possessed an intent to kill without premeditation or 
deliberation, then the state can charge the adolescent with second-
degree murder.338 Further, if the adolescent possessed reckless 
indifference to human life, then the prosecutor can attempt to convict 
the adolescent of second-degree murder for their alleged conscious 
disregard for human life.339 Alternatively, the prosecutor can instead 
attempt to charge the adolescent with involuntary manslaughter if the 
defendant’s criminal negligence in committing a non-inherently 
 
 333. See Levick et al., supra note 16, at 296. 
 334. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152, 154 (1987). 
 335. Id. at 157 (describing a person who is “utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob 
may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim’s property”). 
 336. See supra Parts II–IV. 
 337. People v. Chiu, 325 P.3d 972, 979 (Cal. 2018) (“First-degree murder, like second-degree 
murder, is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but has the additional 
elements of willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation which trigger a heightened penalty.”). 
 338. CALJIC No. 8.30 (“Murder of the second degree is . . . the unlawful killing of a human 
being with malice aforethought when the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being but 
the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation.”). 
 339. CALCRIM No. 580 (Murder is “an unlawful killing caused by a willful act done with full 
knowledge and awareness that the person is endangering the life in another and is done in conscious 
disregard of that risk.”). 
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dangerous crime caused the death of another person.340 If the 
prosecutor cannot prove any of the above, the adolescent should only 
be charged for the felony, while the perpetrator who actually killed the 
victim can be charged for murder under the appropriate murder statute. 
Instead, as the statute stands today, a prosecutor has the ability to 
charge an adolescent with first-degree murder when they simply 
possessed a reckless mental state in committing the felony.341 
Though the perpetrators in Contreras and Graham were non-
homicide offenders, as both courts stated, those who do not kill, intend 
to kill, or foresee death, are less morally reprehensible and therefore 
less culpable.342 The courts did not simply state that murderers were 
different from nonmurderers. Instead, the courts specifically 
differentiated two groups of people by their intent and lack of intent 
to kill. Though a killing that results from the perpetration of a felony 
can be a “murder” under the felony murder statute, an adolescent 
involved in a felony who does not kill, intend to kill, and also does not 
foresee death because of their developmental immaturity, is still less 
culpable under the Contreras and Graham standard than one who 
does. Furthermore, the qualifications that the Contreras court and 
Graham Court used to ultimately find the defendants less morally 
reprehensible and deserving of shorter sentences are the same 
characteristics that adolescents lack when they recklessly engage in a 
felony that they do not intend to result in death. 
The Contreras court acknowledged that rape is a serious crime 
that warrants a serious punishment.343 Like rape, an act that results in 
 
 340. CALCRIM No. 581. A person commits involuntary manslaughter if the defendant’s 
criminal negligence caused the death of another. A defendant acts with criminal negligence when 
they act in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury and a reasonable 
person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In contrast to murder, 
the defendant does not possess a conscious disregard to human life. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) 
(West 2015). 
 341. Typically, recklessness is reserved for second-degree murder. See CALCRIM Nos. 520, 
580. 
 342. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010); People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 463 
(Cal. 2018). 
 343. Contreras, 411 P.3d at 462–63 (“In so holding, we do not minimize the gravity of 
defendants’ crimes or their lasting impact on the victims and their families. No one reading the 
disturbing facts of this case could disagree with the trial court that the crimes were ‘awful and 
shocking.’ The Court of Appeal was correct to observe that ‘[w]hatever their final sentences, 
Rodriguez and Contreras will need to do more than simply bide their time in prison to demonstrate 
parole suitability. . . . The record before us indicates Rodriguez and Contreras have much work 
ahead of them if they hope to one day persuade the Board they no longer present a current danger 
to society and should be released on parole.’”). 
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a killing is a serious crime that should not be taken lightly. 
Nevertheless, an unintentional killing greatly differs from an 
intentional killing in a moral and logical sense. This difference 
warrants a lower charge and, as follows, a less severe punishment. 
B.  Felony Murder’s Effects on Sentencing and Transfers 
This Note suggests that the California felony murder “major 
participant” and “reckless indifference” standards should not apply to 
adolescents, rather than merely suggesting that adolescents should 
receive shorter sentences. Nevertheless, this proposition naturally 
affects the likelihood of the transfer of minors to adult court and 
adolescents’ punishments if adolescents are charged with second-
degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, or simply the underlying 
felony, rather than first-degree murder. Therefore, it is imperative to 
discuss the transfer and sentencing effects on minors and more 
broadly, adolescents. 
1.  Transfers 
CWIC section 707 outlines the procedure of transferring a minor 
from juvenile court to adult court.344 Upon a transfer, the minor is tried 
as an adult, given an adult sentence, and placed in an adult correctional 
facility.345 Following the passage of Proposition 1391 in September 
2018, only minors ages sixteen and seventeen can be tried as adults in 
adult court.346 Further, before transferring the minor from juvenile 
court to adult court, the juvenile court must consider mitigating criteria 
in making its decision.347 
Under the proposed amendments to the current felony murder 
scheme outlined in this Note, if a minor is charged with the underlying 
felony or involuntary manslaughter instead of murder, then the minor 
may not qualify to be transferred under CWIC section 707.348 It is true 
 
 344. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 2019). 
 345. See Flynn, supra note 84, at 1057, 1059. 
 346. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a)(2) (West 2016 & Supp. 2016). Generally, the minor 
must be sixteen or older, but a minor who committed a crime when they were fourteen or fifteen 
and was not apprehended prior to their eighteenth birthday, then the prosecution can move to have 
the offender transferred to adult court. 
 347. See id. § 707(a)(3). 
 348. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (West 2019) (outlining the offenses that can 
trigger a transfer motion). Involuntary manslaughter is not an offense that can trigger a transfer 
motion if the perpetrator does not use a weapon enumerated in California Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 16950. See id. 
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that included in the offenses that can trigger a transfer are many of the 
felonies outlined in the felony murder statute.349 However, burglary is 
one felony that does not trigger a transfer motion but is included in the 
felony murder statute.350 
Further, included in the criteria that the juvenile court must assess 
in deciding to transfer the minor is the seriousness of the offense.351 
Therefore, even if a charge of the underlying felony could allow the 
prosecutor to file a transfer motion, the lesser offense of the felony, 
instead of murder, will weigh against transferring the minor. 
Moreover, even a second-degree murder charge can reduce the 
likelihood that that juvenile court decides to grant the transfer motion 
when compared to a first-degree murder charge. 
Transfers are important because transferred minors may receive 
longer and harsher sentences in adult court, and minors are at an 
increased risk of experiencing physical, sexual, and psychological 
victimization and harmful disruptions in their cognitive 
development.352 Ultimately, transferring a minor to adult court 
characterizes them as adults twice: first, by finding the youthful 
offender culpable enough to be transferred to adult court, next by 
holding the youthful offender to the same adult standard when 
charging them with a crime. Just appearing in an adult court creates 
the illusion that the individual’s conduct is more culpable. 
Further, the juvenile justice system’s primary goal is to 
rehabilitate the minor during the time of their lives when their 
identities are most amenable to change.353 A critical consideration in 
sentencing a minor is the chance that the minor will be rehabilitated 
 
 349. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(a) (West 2019) (including “arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, 
burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 288, 
288a, or 289, or murder that is perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, 
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death” as felonies that 
trigger first-degree felony murder); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (West 2016 & Supp. 2019) 
(listing murder, arson, robbery, rape, sodomy, kidnapping, discharge of a firearm, carjacking, and 
acts under section 288, 289 as offenses that qualify to file a transfer motion). 
 350. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b) (West 2019). 
 351. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a)(3)(E)(i) (West 2016 & Supp. 2019) (“The 
circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by the 
minor.”). 
 352. Mulvey & Schubert, supra note 285, at 3–6 
 353. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 2016) (stating that the purpose of the juvenile 
courts is to “provide for the protection and safety of the public” while providing juveniles with 
“protective services . . . care, treatment, and guidance consistent with their best interest” and the 
“rehabilitative objectives” of the code); Henning, supra note 20, at 1122. 
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and will reenter society as a law-abiding citizen.354 However, adult 
facilities are not designed to foster identities outside the prison walls, 
and placing youthful offenders in adult facilities creates a dangerous 
environment that exposes youthful offenders to heightened stress and 
trauma.355 
Changing the way that the state charges minors can reduce 
transfers. As a result, youthful offenders will have an increased chance 
of rehabilitating and will be less likely to reoffend.356 Studies show 
that minors who are transferred, compared to those who were not 
transferred, are more likely to reoffend, and reoffend more quickly.357 
Therefore, limiting transfers will allow more minors to start a 
promising life once they complete their sentences. 
2.  Sentencing 
In California, an involuntary manslaughter charge results in 
imprisonment of between two and four years.358 A robbery charge can 
result in two to nine years.359 A second-degree murder conviction 
results in fifteen years to life in a state prison.360 A conviction of first-
degree murder, at a minimum, results in imprisonment for twenty-five 
years to life.361 Consequently, charging an adolescent with second-
degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, or the underlying felony, 
instead of first-degree felony murder can shave off at least ten years, 
and up to a lifetime in prison from a youthful offender’s sentence, 
ultimately increasing the chances for rehabilitation.362 Further, while 
 
 354. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (stating that it is “misguided to equate the 
failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character 
deficiencies will be reformed”). 
 355. See Mulvey & Schubert, supra note 285, at 5. 
 356. See id. at 3–5, 7. 
 357. Id. at 7 (describing study conducted in Florida and a study performed in Pennsylvania). 
 358. CAL. PENAL CODE § 193 (West 2014). These sentence estimates are based on the 
California Penal Code, and those charged as adults. Juveniles charged in juvenile court will not 
receive state prison sentences but can be placed in the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731. 
 359. CAL. PENAL CODE § 213. 
 360. Id. § 190. If the individual previously served time in prison for murder, a second murder 
charge can result in life imprisonment without parole. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.05 (West 2019). 
However, this would not apply to an adolescent who, realistically, could not have already served 
time for a murder before age twenty-five. 
 361. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 2014) (“Every person guilty of murder in the first-degree 
shall be punished by death, imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole, 
or imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life.”). 
 362. Id. As stated, the minimum sentence for second-degree murder is fifteen years and the 
minimum sentence for first-degree murder is twenty-five years. 
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Miller prohibited a mandatory LWOP sentence scheme for minor 
homicide offenders, after a minor is found guilty of murder, and the 
court considers the circumstances of the crime, the court can still 
sentence the minor to LWOP.363 
The courts and legislature have already established that 
imprisoning juveniles for extended periods of time contradicts the 
goals of the juvenile justice system: rehabilitation and reintegration.364 
As described in Graham, juveniles have a once diminished moral 
culpability because of their age, and those “who did not kill or have 
intent to kill,” have a twice-diminished moral culpability.365 If this 
twice diminished culpability rationale is used when deciding whether 
a sentencing practice is harsh, it makes even more sense to apply the 
rationale when deciding that a criminal charge is too harsh to apply to 
youthful offenders. The crime is ultimately what brought the youthful 
offender to the point of sentencing. Therefore, it follows that charging 
adolescents with first-degree murder based on a “reckless 
indifference” standard does not comport with the foundational pillars 
of the juvenile justice system or the basics of adolescent development. 
C.  Felony Murder Justifications Are Even More Baseless When 
Applied to Adolescents 
The felony murder rule has two justifications: deterrence and 
retribution.366 These two purposes promote the idea that “bad actors” 
should be severely punished for engaging in a dangerous felony that 
results in social harm.367 
In theory, the rule will deter individuals from carelessly 
committing felonies and participating in dangerous felonies in the first 
place.368 However, unintentional or unforeseeable acts cannot 
possibly be deterred.369 The only study of the felony murder rule’s 
deterrent effect found little to no deterrent effect and, in some 
instances, even found that the rule increases felony deaths.370 Instead 
 
 363. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 480 (2012). 
 364. See People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 462 (Cal. 2018). 
 365. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010). 
 366. Flynn, supra note 84, at 1063. 
 367. Id. 
 368. See id. 
 369. See id. at 1064. 
 370. Anup Malani, Does the Felony-Murder Rule Deter? Evidence from FBI Crime Data, at 6, 
25 (2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/malani.pdf 
(“[W]ithout the felony murder rule, if a robbery victim died accidentally, the robber has a strong 
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of charging the perpetrator with murder, increasing the punishment of 
the underlying intentional felony can have the same, if not greater, 
deterrent effect.371 
Further, due to adolescent cognitive development, the United 
States Supreme Court continues to recognize that deterrence is not 
effective in the adolescent context.372 Because adolescents have “a 
lack of maturity, an underdeveloped level of responsibility,” and have 
a tendency to engage in impulsive and reckless actions, they are less 
likely to consider the possible punishments when making decisions.373 
Therefore, “the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable 
than adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to 
deterrence.”374 
Therefore, if an adolescent inherently possesses a reckless 
character and rarely considers the immediate consequences of their 
actions, a first-degree murder charge based on reckless indifference 
will not deter the adolescent from engaging in reckless behavior that 
results in unforeseen consequences. Even if an adolescent does weigh 
the risks involved, an adolescent’s vulnerability to outside pressure, 
heightened sensitivity to rewards, and tendency to underappreciate 
risks increase the chances that an adolescent will still engage in the 
risky behavior.375 
Moreover, studies suggest that there is no significant difference 
in the deterrence effect of a death penalty and LWOP sentence because 
adolescents lack foresight and pay more attention to short-term 
gratification than long-term consequences.376 
A deterrence justification also assumes that the felonious 
individual understands the risks inherent in their actions and is aware 
of the severe punishment they will face for any death that results from 
 
incentive to avoid intentionally causing additional deaths because his punishment would increase 
from a robbery sentence to a murder sentence. [But] [w]ith the rule, after causing the accidental 
death,” the “increment in punishment” for a second murder is smaller, decreasing the disincentive 
to intentionally take additional lives.). 
 371. Id. at 25; Flynn, supra note 84, at 1064. 
 372. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
 373. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72. 
 374. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571). 
 375. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 295. 
 376. ABA Brief, Miller v. Alabama, supra note 18, at 18; Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUV. JUST. (2006), 
http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue_brief_3.pdf. 
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the felony.377 Instead, it is unlikely that the perpetrator knows that they 
are engaging in what is considered a felony under the California Penal 
Code, and it is even more unlikely that they know that the felony 
murder rule exists or how it functions, especially if the perpetrator is 
an adolescent.378 
A retribution justification provides that a criminal sentence is 
proportional to the criminal’s culpability.379 However, the felony 
murder rule holds the defendant responsible for any death that results 
from their involvement in the felony, even if they did not intend to 
cause any harm.380 Measuring punishment based on resulting harm 
equally punishes individuals who accidently kill, and those who 
intentionally kill. Consequently, two very different types of 
perpetrators receive the same sentence that is “traditionally [only] 
reserved for the most culpable offenders.”381 
The felony murder rule’s retribution justification is even more 
irrational when applied to adolescents. The purpose of retribution is to 
proportionally punish an individual based on their culpability.382 
However, the scientific findings cited in recent court decisions and 
legislation state that adolescents possess a twice-diminished 
culpability when compared to adults.383 Therefore, punishing an 
adolescent without considering their individual characteristics ignores 
these crucial findings. Adolescents should be punished in line with not 
only the harm that resulted but also their diminished culpability due to 
their youth. As a result, adolescents should not be charged with first-
degree murder based on a “reckless indifference” standard, and their 
youthful characteristics should be considered before they can be 
charged with second-degree murder based on a felony murder theory. 
D.  Youthful Offenders, Reformation, and Rehabilitation 
While applying the felony murder rule to adolescents under age 
twenty-five directly conflicts with scientific research, applying the 
rule to individuals under eighteen further conflicts with the goals of 
 
 377. Keller, supra note 25, at 305; Contra Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra note 
376, at 2. 
 378. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 43, at 452. 
 379. Keller, supra note 25, at 311. 
 380. See Flynn, supra note 84, at 1064. 
 381. Id. at 1065. 
 382. Id. at 1063, 1065. 
 383. Supra Part IV; Flynn, supra note 84, at 1072. 
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the juvenile justice system. The primary purpose of having a juvenile 
justice system separate from adult criminal court is to reform and 
rehabilitate youthful offenders.384 Because minors are far less likely to 
have an “irretrievably depraved character” than adults, rehabilitation 
in juvenile detention centers gives minors a chance to reform and 
productively reenter society.385 Therefore, charging a minor with first-
degree murder, a charge that inevitably comes with a lengthy or 
lifelong sentence, for possessing recklessness has no place in 
California law. 
Further, research shows that the developmental immaturity that 
contributes to adolescents’ reckless behavior is transitory, and when 
given the opportunity, adolescents are capable of change.386 Due to 
increased development during adolescence, as risk-taking behavior 
peaks, so does criminal engagement, but both simultaneously decline 
thereafter.387 Accordingly, numerous studies have found that only a 
small percentage—5 to 10 percent—of youthful offenders become 
“chronic” juvenile offenders who continue offending into 
adulthood.388 The large majority of youthful offenders do not grow up 
to become adult criminals but, instead, are capable of parting with their 
criminal behavior and integrating successfully into society as law-
abiding citizens.389 Research indicates that developmental immaturity 
is the major factor that distinguishes youth who persist in crime and 
those who do not, and that once developmental immaturity is 
accounted for, age may not have a direct effect on crime.390 Because 
youthful offenders’ developmental maturity contributes to their 
 
 384. Daniel P. Mears et al., Public Opinion and the Foundation of the Juvenile Court, 45 
CRIMINOLOGY 223, 226 (2007). 
 385. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
 386. Levick et al., supra note 16, at 298. 
 387. Peter W. Greenwood, Responding to Juvenile Crime: Lessons Learned, 6 FUTURE OF 
CHILD. 75, 77–78 (1996); Caufman et al., supra note 182, at 26. 
 388. Greenwood, supra note 387, at 77–78; Levick et al., supra note 16, at 297 (citing a study 
that found that “chronic” juvenile offenders with five or more arrests only make up approximately 
6 percent of the juvenile offender population). The Pathways to Desistance Study, a longitudinal 
study of over 1,000 felony-offenders, also found that fewer than 10 percent of the participating 
youth persisted in high-level offending after seven years. Caufman et al., supra note 182, at 27. 
 389. Caufman et al., supra note 182, at 27. 
 390. Kathryn C. Monahan et al., Trajectories of Antisocial Behavior and Psychosocial Maturity 
from Adolescence to Young Adulthood, 45 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1654, 1665 (2009); see 
Gary Sweeten et al., Age and the Explanation of Crime, Revisited, 42 J. YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE 
921, 934–35 (2013) (explaining that age acts as a “proxy” for criminality). 
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criminal tendencies, punishing them for their inherent “reckless 
indifference” is harsh and counterproductive. 
Imprisoning adolescents for the majority, if not all, of their lives 
because they possessed recklessness that was caused by 
developmental immaturity, and almost positively would have 
dissipated with age, does not give adolescents an opportunity to 
change. As Graham and Miller stated, not even rehabilitation can 
justify a sentence of life without parole because such a sentence 
eliminates a rehabilitative possibility by keeping the individual 
expelled from society forever.391 Ultimately, charging an adolescent 
with first-degree murder for “reckless indifference” ignores the 
developmental difference between adolescents and adults and the 
proven transitory nature of an adolescent’s reckless character and 
contradicts current jurisprudence. 
E.  Methods for Change 
There are at least three possible ways that California can limit the 
felony murder rule as applied to adolescents: (1) prosecutorial policy 
changes; (2) judicial decisions in the California or United States 
Supreme Court; or (3) California legislative action. These three 
avenues would limit the application of the felony murder rule so that, 
under the “reckless indifference” standard outlined in the felony 
murder rule, (a) adolescents cannot be charged with first-degree 
murder; and (b) a judge must analyze the adolescents’ culpability 
using the factors listed in CWIC section 707 before adolescents can be 
charged with second-degree felony murder. 
As stated above, charging an adolescent with first-degree murder 
for possessing a “reckless indifference” equates an adolescent’s and 
an adult’s culpability and is incompatible with recent jurisprudence 
recognizing that an adolescent possesses a weak ability to make 
informed and rational decisions.392 Further, charging an individual 
with second-degree felony murder under a reckless indifference 
standard still allows the state to analyze the individual’s major 
participation in the felony and reckless indifference in engaging in the 
 
 391. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012) (stating that rehabilitation could not justify 
a sentence of life without parole because it “forswears the rehabilitative ideal” because it reflects 
“an irrevocable judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society,” at odds with a child’s 
capacity for change” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72–74 (2010))). 
 392. Root, supra note 42, at 60–61. 
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felony.393 Therefore, the adolescent with alleged reckless indifference 
will still be punished for their decision to engage in the felony, and not 
necessarily the murder. Instead, as proposed in this Note, the 
adolescent’s culpability should be assessed before charging them with 
murder instead of the underlying felony. 
1.  Prosecutorial Policy Changes 
 Under the first avenue, district attorneys’ offices can implement 
a prosecutorial policy that limits the way prosecutors charge 
adolescents under the felony murder rule. This policy would prohibit 
prosecutors from charging adolescents with first-degree felony murder 
under the amended California Penal Code section 189 based on the 
“reckless indifference” standard. In recognizing an adolescent’s 
diminished cognitive capacity, the policy would also encourage 
prosecutors to pursue involuntary manslaughter or simply felony 
charges, instead of murder charges, when an adolescent engages in a 
dangerous felony that that they did not intend to result in death. 
Implementing a new policy could be easier and faster than 
waiting for the legislature to pass an amended statute or waiting for 
the California Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court to issue 
a policy-changing decision. However, such a policy is unstable. Either 
the Chief Prosecutors from each county or the California Attorney 
General could implement the policy. If the Attorney General or Chief 
Prosecutors implement the policy, it could easily be revoked with the 
election of a new Chief Prosecutor or Attorney General who does not 
agree with the policy. Implementing policies by county would also 
likely result in inconsistent policies across California, with 
adolescents receiving more protection in some counties than others 
due to the political climate. Further, policies are guidelines, as 
opposed to hard rules that prosecutors are mandated to follow, like a 
legislative statute or judicial decision. Without having a law requiring 
them to do so, it would be difficult to prohibit prosecutors from 
charging adolescents with first-degree felony murder and to require 
prosecutors to consider certain factors before charging an adolescent 
with second-degree felony murder. 
 
 393. Id. at 27. 
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2.  Judicial Decisions in the California or 
United States Supreme Court 
As a second option, the California or United States Supreme 
Court could rule on the issue.394 However, in order to amend the felony 
murder rule through the judiciary, there must be a case that presents a 
clear violation of either the California Constitution or United States 
Constitution. Like in People v. Contreras, the California Supreme 
Court could decide that charging an adolescent with first-degree 
murder under a “reckless indifference” standard is considered cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.395 The 
court could find that the sentence given to those convicted of first-
degree murder is unjustifiably long for an adolescent with a twice-
diminished capacity. Further, the court could decide that factors 
associated with adolescence must be considered before charging an 
adolescent with second-degree felony murder. 
The recent trend in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has been to recognize adolescents’ unique characteristics that make 
them less capable of making informed decisions, more vulnerable to 
outside pressures, and less culpable than adults.396 This trend creates 
hope that the courts will appreciate the problems with the current 
felony murder rule, especially as applied to adolescents. However, 
using this method would take a great deal of time. It would require 
finding a case with relevant facts and precedential value to litigate up 
to the California or United States Supreme Court. 
3.  California Legislative Action 
The third, and likely best, option is through the California 
legislature.397 Just as the felony murder rule was amended under S.B. 
 
 394. In People v. Aaron, the Michigan Supreme Court abolished the common law felony 
murder rule. 299 N.W.2d 304, 329 (Mich. 1980). With the Michigan Supreme Court finding that 
the felony murder rule had no place in Michigan, one justice stated: 
The Court has correctly outlined the injudicious and unprincipled premises on which the 
common-law doctrine of felony murder rests. The basic infirmity of the felony-
murder rule lies in its failure to correlate, to any degree, criminal liability with moral 
culpability. It permits one to be punished for a killing, with the most severe penalty in 
the law, without requiring proof of any mental state with respect to the killing. This 
incongruity is more than the state’s criminal jurisprudence should be permitted to bear. 
Id. at 334 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 395. People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445 (Cal. 2018). 
 396. Supra Part IV. 
 397. Michigan, Kentucky, and Hawaii have all abolished the felony murder rule by amending 
their murder statutes. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (West 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-
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1437, the California legislature can pass a new bill that limits the 
felony murder rule when applied to adolescents. California Penal Code 
section 189 would be amended to include a subdivision (g) excluding 
adolescents from subdivision 189(e)(3), which charges an individual 
with first-degree felony murder based on the “reckless indifference” 
standard.398 The new section would state that subdivision (e)(3) does 
not apply to a defendant who is under the age of twenty-five and that 
before charging an adolescent with second-degree murder under a 
felony murder theory, the judge must analyze the defendant’s 
culpability using the same factors listed in CWIC section 707. 
Like Proposition 57, S.B. 1391, and other recent legislature in 
juvenile justice reform, it is important to create a bright line age 
cutoff.399 While eighteen is the age that “draws the line for many 
purposes between childhood and adulthood” and presents a 
compromise to prosecutors’ potential push-back, the research that 
courts and legislatures rely on in protecting youthful offenders is based 
on the conclusions that individuals’ thoughts, actions, and emotions 
continue to mature throughout their early twenties.400 Therefore, the 
cutoff that would most effectively protect youthful offenders would be 
age twenty-five. 
As mentioned, pushback from prosecutors may limit the 
possibility of legislative action. Just as prosecutors challenged S.B. 
1437, they likely will challenge a bill further limiting the felony 
murder rule.401 Though going through the state legislature always 
 
701 (West 2016); People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672 (1980) (eliminating the felony murder rule in 
Michigan); Kevin E. McCarthy, OLR Research Report, Connecticut General Assembly, Feb. 13, 
2008, https://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-r-0087.htm. Ohio effectively eliminated the felony 
murder rule by replacing felony murder with an involuntary manslaughter statute. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (West 2019); McCarthy, supra. In the commentary to Hawaii’s amendment, 
the Hawaii legislature stated, “Engaging in certain penally-prohibited behavior may, of course, 
evidence a recklessness sufficient to establish manslaughter, or a practical certainty or intent, with 
respect to causing death, sufficient to establish murder, but such a finding is an independent 
determination which must rest on the facts of each case.” Commentary on § 707-701, Hawaii State 
Legislature, https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol14_Ch0701-
0853/HRS0707/HRS_0707-0701.htm. 
 398. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e)(3) (West 2019). 
 399. See S.B. 1391, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (setting age sixteen as the youngest 
age of minors who can be transferred to adult court unless the minor committed the offense when 
they were fourteen or fifteen years old but they were not apprehended prior to turning eighteen). 
 400. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005); see AMA Brief, supra note 16, at 3. 
 401. See Jessica Pishko, Hundreds Stuck in Prison in California as Prosecutors Seek to Block 
New Law, APPEAL, (Mar. 25, 2019) https://theappeal.org/hundreds-stuck-in-prison-in-california-
as-prosecutors-seek-to-block-new-law/. The period of time between twelve and twenty-five years 
old is a period that psychologists have defined as a period of heightened development. See Steinberg 
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depends on the political climate at the time, it appears to be the fastest 
and most stable way of making the much-needed amendment. Further, 
based on legislative action in juvenile justice reform in 2018, the 
legislature seems to be supportive of additional protections for 
youthful offenders despite prosecutors’ pushback.402 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The felony murder rule should be restricted so that an adolescent 
cannot be charged with first-degree murder by simply possessing a 
“reckless indifference to human life.” Allowing a first-degree murder 
charge based on a lower mental culpability “erodes the relation 
between criminal liability and moral culpability,” especially when 
applied to adolescents.403 Further, an amended felony murder rule 
should require that a judge assess the adolescent’s culpability 
characteristics, much like they are before transfers under CWIC 
section 707, before an adolescent is charged with second-degree 
felony murder under the reckless indifference standard. In the 
alternative, prosecutors could try to charge such adolescents with 
involuntary manslaughter or the underlying felony. 
A prosecutor should not be able to charge an adolescent with one 
of the most morally reprehensible crimes based on the adolescent’s 
decision to engage in a felony that resulted in unforeseen 
consequences. Instead, a prosecutor should be required to prove that 
the adolescent’s act and mental culpability fit within the appropriate 
murder statute, while analyzing the felony separately. Similar to the 
reasoning used by the Hawaii legislature in abolishing the felony 
murder rule, the decision to engage in a felony may be a factor in 
determining recklessness under a second-degree murder or 
manslaughter charge, but that determination should be made on a case 
by case basis, rather than mandated by a broad sweeping statute.404 
 
& Schwartz, supra note 3, at 27 (“[M]ost identity development takes place during the late teens and 
early twenties.”); Waterman, supra note 3, at 355 (“The most extensive advances in identity 
formation occur during the time spent in college.”). 
 402. See S.B. 1391, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); S.B. 1437, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2018); S.B. 439, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 403. People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 709 (1983). 
 404. Further, while the felony murder rule is arguably illogical even when applied to adults, 
limiting the felony murder rule as applied to adolescents is a crucial first step needed to quickly 
conform to the current jurisprudence and to advance juvenile justice reform. 
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Further, charging a minor with a murder because of a supposed 
recklessness in committing a felony undermines the goals of the 
juvenile justice system. As data suggests, the felony murder scheme 
does not meet the supposed objectives of deterrence and 
rehabilitation.405 The United States Supreme Court, California 
legislature, and California courts continue to make decisions that 
further protect youthful offenders in the criminal justice system. As 
discussed, in prohibiting courts from sentencing nonhomicide 
offenders who did not kill, intend to kill, or foresee death to lengthy 
sentences, the court in Contreras recognized the developmental and 
behavioral differences between adolescents and adults. In addition, the 
passing of SB 1391 amended a proposition that already protected 
minors and once again raised the age permitted to transfer a juvenile 
to adult court. The bill acknowledged that minors do not belong in 
adult criminal court because their reckless nature is transitory, and 
shorter sentences and a rehabilitative environment will more 
effectively decrease their criminal behavior.406 
The California courts and legislature are willing to afford 
adolescents more protection because science has indicated that 
adolescents and adults are cognitively different, and thus, adolescents 
are less culpable. Using the same rationale employed time and time 
again, not only in California but in the United States Supreme Court, 
California should take the next logical step in recognizing that 
adolescents have a diminished cognitive capacity and should limit the 













 405. See supra Section V(D). 
 406. Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., supra note 312. 
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